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Organizing for Change: 
A Community Law Response 
to Police Misconduct 
by Dianne L. Martin* 
This paper addresses the problem of police misconduct in a historical 
and theoretical context that examines prior efforts at reform and argues 
for the development of a new, collaborative approach. This examination 
critiques the domination of legal strategies in the past and looks for 
community-based initiatives with a view to achieving fundamental struc-
tural change. The context is local and particularized in the City of 
Toronto and in a community legal clinic. The lessons, it is argued, are 
universal. Clinic files, media accounts, and inquiry records are drawn 
upon to center the discussion in the "real world" of poverty, perception, 
and public response. 
PREFACE 
Pictures of riots in Los Angeles in the wake of the acquittal of the 
four police officers criminally charged with the brutal beating of Rodney 
King resonate with the images of the riots that erupted there in 1965, also 
sparked by the arrest of a black man, and remind us that the harm caused 
by unredressed police misconduct is not a new problem. Nor is it a prob-
lem limited to cities marred by extreme violence or overtly out-of-control 
police forces. Police violence, perjury, systemic racism, and sexism are as 
likely to be problems in Canada, in a city such as Toronto, with its rela-
tively low crime rate and its "ideal" forum for civilian review (discussed 
in some detail in this paper), as anywhere. Police misconduct, moreover, 
is highly resistant to resolution. Indeed, it is its ubiquitous, entrenched na-
ture that calls for innovative responses and collaborative lawyering prac-
tices. The challenge, for theorists and practitioners alike, is to interrogate 
* Assistant Professor, Osgoode Hall Law School of York University, Academic 
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the dominant analysis of and responses to the problem and to envision 
more satisfactory solutions. This paper offers a beginning. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
First presented at a symposium entitled "The Theoretics of Practice," 
held in January 1992 at Hastings Law School, this paper offers both a 
feminist definition and analysis of police misconduct and an argument for 
the application of an alternative approach to its reform. This alternative 
strategy grows out of the theory and practices of a particular community-
based legal clinic. The legal clinic combines community organizing and 
education, individual casework, and law reform initiatives in relatively 
equal measures in its approach to the legal issues that affect a low-in-
come community. These methods are presently being used to address the 
problem of police misconduct in an initiative that also demonstrates the 
practical value of critical analysis. 
A. THE CONTEXT: THE CITY, THE COMMUNITY, AND THE CLINIC 
Canadian, American, British, and occasionally other sources are uti-
lized in this paper, as both the legal rules and the political climate in 
which police function are more similar than different throughout the com-
mon law world. The particularized focus, however, is on Toronto, a met-
ropolitan center of some 3.2 million people with a police force of 7,000 
members (some 5,700 actual peace officers). Crime rates in Canada are 
relatively low (the national homicide rate is lower than that recorded in 
many United States cities)l but are widely reported in the press and are 
perceived by the citizens of Toronto as very threatening.2 The police 
1. For example, in 1990 there were a total of 656 homicides (which includes 
murder, manslaughter, and infanticide) in all of Canada (a population of approximately 
27 million), of which 502 were cleared. Violent crime represents nine percent of 
overall crime figures in Canada; Statistics Canada compares 246 violent crimes per 
100,000 versus 667 per 100,000 in the United States. Canadian Centre for Justice 
Statistics, Canadian Crime Statistics (1991) (on file with author). The media tend to 
pay close attention to the release of these statistics and both report on them and 
incorporate them into more subjective pieces detailing "growing fear." See, e.g., Cana-
dian Press, Violent Crime up 52% in 80's, THE TORONTO STAR, Mar. 27, 1992. 
2. See supra note 1 for typical reporting of government crime statistics. The media 
both covered the fear and perhaps fed it. See, e.g., Patricia Owen, Living With The 
Fear of Crime, THE TORONTO STAR, Mar. 22, 1992, at Bl (more people are trying 
to protect themselves, but are they overreacting?). The article notes that only one-half 
of one percent of homeowners will ever actually meet a burglar, but that rarity is 
never mentioned in crime reporting. Jim Wilkes, 2 Ontario Cities Top National List 
for Murder Rate, THE TORONTO STAR, Mar. 4, 1992. Sudbury, Ontario is the "mur-
der capital of Canada" with seven murders in 1991, a murder rate of 4.65 per 
100,000. Toronto was eleventh at 2.70, based on the Greater Toronto Region pop-
ulation and 103 murders. The city itself had eighty-six, the same as in 1989 and 
twenty-six more than the previous high in 1987. 
AQAA4sg ,""., 
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enjoy a fairly high degree of community support, and police critics are 
viewed with some suspicion.3 That said, there is a growing willingness to 
recognize problems in "police-community relations," and an increasingly 
vocal minority community is detailing concerns about issues such as po-
lice violence and racism. For example, a demonstration of solidarity over 
the acquittals in the Rodney King case planned for May 4, 1992, broke 
down into a significant "riot" of looting and vandalism that shocked the 
city. The demonstration was planned by the Black Action Defence Com-
mittee. This organization came together in Toronto in 1988 in the wake 
of the acquittal of a police officer in the shooting death of a partially 
disabled black man, armed with a paring knife, in his own home. The or-
ganization drew parallels between the acquittals in the King case and 
recent cases in the Toronto area. A month earlier, two officers had been 
acquitted of all charges arising out of the shooting death of an unarmed 
black youth who was killed by police shots fired through the rear window 
of the stolen car he was driving. Two days before the planned demonstra-
tion, another black youth suspected of drug trafficking was shot and 
killed by police officers in a Toronto alley. Media coverage of the inci-
dents and the riot made the race connection.4 
In the late 1970s, similar public concerns voiced about police miscon-
duct and existing police-controlled complaint mechanisms led to the es-
tablishment of a civilian review agency to deal with complaints of mis-
conduct from members of the public in Toronto.5 The Office of the Po-
3. For example, an editorial in the largest of Toronto's three daily papers ex-
pressed concern about a judge who disbelieved police officers who testified before 
him and then insisted on seeing the results of an internal police investigation regard-
ing his rulings. Editorial, Judge Matlow Crossed the Line, THE TORONTO STAR, Aug. 
18, 1991, at A4. The editorial writer took the view that belief in the possibility of a 
cover-up was tantamount to joining a campaign against the police, revealing that he 
believes the police capable not only of lying but also of covering up. Matlow pre-
sented himself as an advocate in a campaign against Ontario's policing system. That 
position was criticized as being utterly incompatible with his judicial role. 
4. Kelly Toughlll, Black Man Shot Dead by Undercover Police Officer; Gunfire in 
Backyard Ends Pre-Dawn Chase, THE SUNDAY STAR, May 3, 1992, at AI; Andrew 
Duffy, Joseph Hall & Bruce Demara, Hundreds Riot Downtown After Anti-Racism 
Protest; Metro Police, Mob, Clashed on Yonge St., THE TORONTO STAR, May 5, 
1992, at Al (a peaceful demonstration at the United States consulate turned into 
looting, vandalism, and violence); Gay Abbate, Jane Coutts, Jock Ferguson, Sean 
O'Malley & James Macgowan, Yonge St. Trashed as Justice Protest Turns Into Ram-
page; Acting Chief Says Rally Organizers to Blame for "Saddest Day" in His Career, 
THE GLOBE AND MAIL, May 5, 1992, at AI. See also infra note 72. 
5. Clare E. Lewis, the current head of the complaint commission, details the histo-
ry of the system as a response to growing public concern in Clare E. Lewis, Police 
Complaints in Metropolitan Toronto: Perspectives of the Public Complaints Commis-
sioner, in COMPLAINTS AGAINST TIlE POllCE: THE TREND TO EXTERNAL REVIEW 153-
76 (Andrew 1. Goldsmith ed., 1991) (on file with author) [hereinafter COMPLAINTS 
AGAINST POllCE]. 
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lice Complaints Commissioner (PCC) is authorized to provide indepen-
dent review and resolution of citizen complaints (including sanctioning 
officers found guilty of misconduct) while leaving most initial investiga-
tions of complaints in police hands.6 The system is frequently praised 
and offered as a model for other jurisdictions and was extended to cover 
all police forces in the province in 1991.7 Concern about misconduct 
remains high, however, and, particularly for vulnerable and minority 
members of the community, remains an issue of fear.s 
The issue of police misconduct has been taken up in the Toronto 
community of Parkdale, home to a unique project of Osgoode Hall Law 
School of York University and the Ontario Legal Aid Plan - Parkdale 
Community Legal Services (PCLS). Parkdale is a low-income community 
in Toronto's west end, which is ethnically heterogenous9 and has an av-
6. Municipal police forces in Ontario are governed by provincial legislation, THE 
POLICE SERVICES Acr, R.S.O. ch. 15 (Can. 1990) [hereinafter POLICE SERVICES Acr], 
which governs everything from jurisdictional questions to discipline and citizen com-
plaints. Part VI of the Act sets out the full disciplinary regime, including a civilian 
oversight component. Citizen complaints are investigated first by police officers as-
signed to the "Police Complaint Bureau." Details of complaints and progress of the 
investigation are reported monthly to the office of the Public Complaint Commissioner 
(PCC), who may intervene at any time. The results of the police investigation of the 
complaint are then provided to the chief or his designate for a determination. He may 
mediate a resolution between the citizen and the subject officer, order a disciplinary 
trial (as above), or "take no furthur action." If the citizen is dissatisfied with the 
result (ninety percent of complaints result in "no furthur action"), she may appeal the 
result to the PCC. The PCC will review the police investigation and may reinvestigate 
the complaint, either in the event of an appeal or if he is dissatisfied with the inves-
tigation, and may order a trial before a "Public Complaint Tribunal," a three-person 
tribunal chaired by one of a panel of lawyers appointed by the Attorney General 
along with one member each from panels composed of appointees from the local 
Police Association (police union) and the Attorney General. The tribunal has full 
disciplinary powers up to and including dismissal. Additional civilian control is im-
posed in the case of serious injury caused by a police officer in the course of duty; 
all police shootings or conduct resulting in serious injury must be investigated by an 
independent civilian body, responsible to the Ministry of the Solicitor General, the 
"Special Investigations Unit." 
7. See, e.g., Werner E. Petterson, Police Accountability and Civilian Oversight of 
Policing: An American Perspective, in COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE, supra note 5, at 
280-83. 
8. The experience of street people who are victims of police violence was de-
scribed in a recent report. The victims have all refused to make formal complaints 
about their allegations for fear of police reprisals. Ten percent of the sample (458: 
106 women and 352 men) reported an assault by police in the past year. Of these, 
35.6 percent had been assaulted more than once. Eileen Ambrosio, Dilin Baker, Cathy 
Crowe & Kathy Hardill, THE STREET HEALTH REPORT 28 (1992) (on file with author) 
(study of the health status and barriers to health of homeless women and men in the 
City of Toronto and the Toronto Health Care Fund). 
9. INTENSIVE PROGRAMME IN POVERTY LAW AT PARKDALE COMMUNITY LEGAL 
SERVICES, CASES AND MATERIALS Vol. I, at 3 (Dianne L. Martin ed., 1991) (on file 
with author) [hereinafter INTENSIVE PROGRAMME]. 
eM Ht. '6 
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techniques of organization, outreach, lobbying, law refonn, casework, and 
central coordination of infonnation. 13 
B. THE THEORY 
The admittedly eclectic methodology of this paper draws on the work 
of feminists who look to the insights of social theorists such as Antonio 
Gramsci 14 to develop an analysis that addresses the ideological, hege-
monic role played by the police and that supports the importance of 
grounding a strategy of resistance to that role in counter-hegemonic prac-
tices such as education and coalition-building. In this approach, compli-
ance with and acceptance of the prevailing social order is seen as relying 
in large part on a shared and unquestioned perception that certain rela-
tions are inevitable, a matter of "common sense.,,15 Thus the role of the 
police in advancing and preserving both that consensus and common 
sense support for its tenets is as much symbolic and ideological as it is 
coercive. Indeed, state-sanctioned force (by the police) to coerce compli-
ance is intended to be used rarely and to be available as a threat as much 
13. The project was recently described by a peLS staff lawyer in the newspaper of 
a progressive lawyers' organization. Ray Kuszelewski, Clarion Call for Action on Po-
lice, 8 (N.S.) THE LAW UNION NEWS, Fall 1992, at 1-13 (on file with author). See 
also infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text. 
14. The sources of this approach are varied. In her introduction, The Shifting 
Boundaries of Public and Private, in WOMEN AND THE STATE 16-20 (Anne 
Showstack Sassoon ed., 1987), Anne Showstack Sassoon draws the connection she 
made through her research and writing on Gramsci to the value of his insights and 
analysis to contemporary feminism, particularly in regard to the debate around the 
state and ideology: 
The women's movement has insisted that women's personal experience 
is political, be it articulated in consciousness raising groups or more 
informally through the kind of networks of friends and acquaintances 
which women have always established. It provides the raw material for 
intellectual and political work as well as solidarity. This coincides 
with a lesson from Gramsci's writings. He argues that the necessary 
starting point for a better understanding of the world must be a criti-
cal analysis of people's common sense. 
[d. at 16. Gramsci's analysis of the role of popular culture in forging a "common 
sense" acceptance of prevailing conditions has been reconsidered by other contempo-
rary theorists and feminists. See generally Mary O'Brien, Hegemony and Superstruc-
ture: A Feminist Critique of Neo-Marxism, in THE POLmCS OF DIVERSITY (R. Hamil-
ton and M. Barrett eds., 1986); Mary O'Brien, Hegemony Theory and Reproduction of 
Patriarchy, in REPRODUCING THE WORLD, EsSAYS IN FEMINIST THEORY (1989); Stuart 
Hall, Gramsci and Us, in THE HARD ROAD TO RENEWAL: THATCHERISM AND THE 
CRISIS OF THE LEFT (1988); GRAMSCI'S POLmCS (Anne Showstack Sassoon ed., 
1987). 
15. The term "common sense," denoting the unquestioning acceptance of precepts 
and mores, was fIrst used by ANToNIO GRAMSCI, SELECI10NS FROM PRISON NOTE-
BOOKS 323-33 (Quinton Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. and trans., 1986) 
(from "the study of philosophy") (on file with author). 
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erage income significantly lower than that of metropolitan Toronto as a 
whole. Much of the housing stock is low-income and in poor repair. The 
largest mental hospital in the province is located in Parkdale, as is the 
highest concentration of group homes and rooming houses in the city. 10 
PCLS is mandated to address the legal needs of the low-income residents 
of this community and is required by its statement of Goals and Objec-
tives to 
(l) . . . establish, maintain and operate a community legal clinic 
within and for the benefit of the Parkdale community in Toronto, 
Ontario, and in connection with this and subject to the applicable 
laws of Ontario from time to time, to provide advice, assistance, 
representation, education and research to both individuals and 
groups, and to organize, carry on and participate in such other 
activities as may from time to time seem expedient for the benefit 
of the Parkdale community. 
(2) In the course of providing services as aforesaid, to participate 
with a university school of law in the education and training of 
students of law.u 
This mandate has given the Clinic the opportunity to provide innova-
tive, community-controlled legal services to Parkdale residents for more 
than twenty years with an equal focus on law reform, organizing, and 
casework. Originally very much a product of the "Just Society" 
movement of the 1970s (not unlike the American "War on Poverty"), the 
Clinic has been committed to grass-roots organizing, coalition-building, 
and law reform since its inception. 12 Staffed by law students as the front 
line caseworkers within a relatively well-funded system of legal aid, 
PCLS has seen its mandate as being at the cutting edge of legal services, 
working "on the margins" of poverty law. This new tradition is presently 
being brought to bear on the entrenched and resistant problem of police 
misconduct and bias. The Parkdale police project is collecting case histo-
ries (while protecting confidentiality), refusing to permit any individual 
complaint to be isolated, discredited, or forgotten. The project is working 
to expose the lie about misconduct (that it did not happen) using multiple 
10. Id. at 3. 
11. Id at 6. Twenty law students per semester work under the joint supervision of 
a community legal worker and a staff lawyer. 
12. For a discussion of this "movement" (and its evolution into a "system") com-
paring Canada with the United States, see R.I. Gathercole, Legal Services and the 
Poor, in LAWYERS AND THE CONSUMER INTEREST: REGULATING THE MARKET FOR 
LEGAL SERVICES 527 (Robert G. Evans and Michael J. Treblock eds., 1982). Stephen 
Wexler's seminal piece, Practicing Law for Poor People, 79 YALE L.J. 1049 (1970), 
was and is instrumental to the Clinic's approach. See also Steve Bachman, Law, 
Lawyers, and Social Change, 13 N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 1 (1984-85). 
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as anything. Consent and acceptance of rules and mores by the majority 
of citizens is ultimately essential to a stable regime. 
Although mandated to uphold and enforce the law, the police them-
selves recognize that they are to interpret this directive in compliance 
with a far more fundamental imperative: the maintenance of order. Their 
actions and their public performance, within and through the criminal 
law, serve a hegemonic role that is designed to reinforce and reproduce 
actions that ensure containment of the underclass, protection of property, 
and the replication of existing social relations. 16 
Popular misbeliefs about police misconduct include, for example, the 
belief that police misconduct is the result of the odd "bad apple" or that 
it will be eliminated through better training. These kinds of beliefs serve 
a common end and are the building blocks of that hegemony. Thus, ex-
posing the fallacies in these "common sense" propositions is a fIrst step 
in a strategy that attempts to build a different consensus with different 
values. This strategy highlights tactics such as community outreach and 
education and coalition-building around policing issues between groups 
frequently divided by existing power relations: racial minorities, working-
class whites, feminist activists working against violence and pornography, 
and neighborhood activists working against drugs and prostitution, for 
example. 17 
Exposing the ideological and mystifying role and function of law in 
16. Hegemony, in the sense of an overarching consensus for the status quo, is 
central to Gramsci's analysis. See GRAMSCI, supra note 15, at 12-14 (from "the intel-
lectuals"). As Currie, et al., point out, this well-understood hegemonic function is 
rarely explored by criminologists. Currie et al., infra note 22, at 29-31. This aspect of 
policing, suggested in Box, infra note 18, was exhaustively explored in RICHARD V. 
ERICSON, MAKING CRIME: A STUDY OF DETECTIVE WORK 1-22 (1981) and RICHARD 
V. ERICSON, REPRODUCING ORDER: A STUDY OF POLICE PATROL WORK 1-25 (1982) 
(both on file with author). Both works examine the day-to-day lives of patrol officers 
and detectives, their exercise of discretion, and the extent to which they function to 
replicate existing power relations. See also McBARNET, infra note 29. 
17. Some feminist theorists are questioning the strategies that have failed to achieve 
strong coalitions through reliance on law and order and "race-neutral" tactics. See 
Dawn Currie, Battered Women and the State: From The Failure of Theory to a Theo-
ry of Failure, 1 1. HUM. JUST. 77 (1990) (critiquing the focus on criminal justice 
strategies in wife-assault work). In an analysis of anti-pornography strategies, she 
notes that penal legislation will (once again) merely drive porn underground while 
conveying the false message that the state has been responsive to feminist concerns. 
Dawn H. Currie, Representation and Resistance: Feminist Struggles against Pornog-
raphy, in ANATOMY OF GENDER: WOMEN'S STRUGGLE FOR THE BODY 191, 195-97 
(Dawn H. Currie and Valerie Raoul eds., 1992); see also Noga A. Gayle, Black 
Women's Reality and Feminism: An Exploration of Race and Gender, in ANATOMY 
OF GENDER: WOMEN'S STRUGGLE FOR THE BODY 232-42 (Dawn H. Currie and 
Valerie Raoul eds., 1992). Movements such as the Toronto-based "Women Against 
Racist Policing" and the United States-based "Fund for a Feminist Majority" are push-
ing theory and questioning feminist practice around the criminal law and the police 
allover North America. See, e.g., infra text accompanying note 123. 
kg 
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sustaining these common sense fallacies is equally important, however. 
The demystification of law is central to the Parkdale strategy, which de-
centers law by emphasizing community organizing and education. At the 
same time, individual problem-solving through casework, test cases, and 
law reform litigation have a role to play in a community-law response so 
long as these initiatives are recognized as being part of, rather than cen-
tral to, that response. Reaching and preserving a balance among these 
strategies is an important aspect of the PCLS police reform project. 
C. THE METHODOLOGY 
"Police misconduct," as it is used in this article, refers to a wide 
range of police behavior. It includes both serious, overt acts of violence 
and abuse of authority as well as the more hidden, systemic abuses that 
are manifested in racist and sexist attitudes - failure to act, for example, 
in wife assault situations - and resistance to true public accountability. 
The more vivid term "police crime" is usually limited to overt criminal 
conduct, such as corrupt practic~ or brutality, for example, and is includ-
ed in the broader definition.18 These forms of police misconduct are dif-
ficult to prove and difficult to profile from traditional sources. Much of it 
occurs in secret, away from corroborative witnesses, and concerns vulner-
able and low-status victims whose complaints, if they are made at all, are 
relatively easy to dismiss or ignore. More often than not it is not willful 
misconduct at all but rather a reflection of systemic biases and assump-
tions about race, class, and gender. In order to address this reality, tradi-
tional academic sources such as cases, texts, and published studies are 
used to define the parameters of the issue, while less traditional sources, 
such as clinic files, media accounts, and inquiry records, are drawn upon 
to situate the discussion in the "real world" of poverty, perception, and 
public response. 
This approach is not without its difficulties, of course. Media ac-
counts, for example, may be the only factual references available to pro-
vide details of a relevant event, but they must be understood as represent-
ing an interpretation of the event, not an original source. In these cases, 
the newspaper stories are offered for the "truth of their contents," as it 
were, but with a clear recognition of the methodological risks. More fre-
quently, media accounts are included and discussed in order to provide a 
window into popular understanding of an event or issue and a vehicle for 
shaping that understanding. 19 This mixture of anecdotal news accounts, 
18. "Misconduct" is widely used in this broad sense in the criminology literature. 
For example, it is used in this sense in all the articles in a recent collection dealing 
with the subject See COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE, supra note 5. Misconduct is 
distinguished from crime in STEVEN Box, Police Crime, in POWER, CRIME AND MyS-
TIFICATION 80-119 (1983). 
19. The work of criminologists such as Richard Ericson exemplifies this use of 
"P WM.t. iii'" bfil_ 
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secondary sources, court records, and reported cases is not offered as an 
empirical study of police misconduct generally or particularly. It is in-
tended, rather, to provide a backdrop to the thesis that the problem (po-
lice misconduct) is a complex matter that has not been responsive to 
unitary tactics such as traditional legal challenges, but might well respond 
to more collaborative and community-based strategies. 
This article fIrst offers a broad defInition of police misconduct and 
then identifIes an over-reliance on legal tactics as a weakness of prior 
reform initiatives. In searching for new strategies to address the problem, 
the article then examines police resistance to change, police response to 
critics in the context of police practice and structure, and the strictures of 
the dominant ideology. Finally, the localized response of a poverty law 
clinic centered in a large law school in Toronto, Ontario, is described as 
an option for police reform. 
II. THE NATURE OF THE BEAST: 
What police misconduct is (and isn't) 
Police culture and structure are widely recognized by scholars as 
playing a fundamental role in police misconduct.20 Despite considerable 
attention to the subject, or at least to community-police relations and 
complaints of misconduct, however, there has been little fundamental 
change in that structure or culture for many years. Analyses written more 
than twenty-fIve years ago seeking to understand the causes of the riots 
in Watts and black ghettoes all over America might have been written 
last week in their identifIcation of the root causes of poverty and despair 
and in their description of police misconduct as the spark that ignited the 
Los Angeles riots of 1992.21 
media accounts. See supra note 16 and accompanying text concerning Ericson's work 
on the police. His later work has focused on the role of the media in shaping both 
public and police discourse and attitudes toward policing issues. RICHARD V. ERICSON, 
PATRICIA BARANEK & JANET B.L. CHAN, NEGOTIATING CONTROL: A STUDY OF 
NEWS SOURCES (1989); RICHARD V. ERICSON, PATRICIA BARANEK & JANET B.L. 
CHAN, REPRESENTING ORDER: CRIME, LAW, AND JUSTICE IN THE NEWS MEDIA 
(1991); Richard V. Ericson, Mass Media, Crime, Law, and Justice: An Institutional 
Approach, 31 THE BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 219 (works on file with author). 
20. See COMPLAINTS AGAINST POllCE, supra note 5, at 19-27; JOHN SEWELL, PO-
llCE URBAN POllCING IN CANADA 175-99 (1985) (a critical examination of contem-
porary police issues); CLIFFORD D. SHEARING, ORGANIZATIONAL POLICE DEVIANCE: 
ITS STRUCfURE AND CONTROL 83-110 (1981) (a collection of critical criminology 
pieces from Canada, the United States, and Britain); Box, supra note 18, at 80-95. 
21. See Robert M. Fogelson, White on Black: A Critique of the McCone Commis-
sion Report on the Los Angeles Riots, in THE POLmCAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY 
LXXXll 337-67 (1967) (on file with author); see also Lee Bridges, Keeping the Lid 
On: British Urban Social Policy 1975-81, RACE & CLAss, XXllI 171-85 (1981-2) (on 
file with author) (race riots in Britain in the mid-1970s and 1980s were similarly 
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The lack of progress is not for lack of attention; many options for 
reform have been proposed or introduced over the years. Apart from 
addressing misconduct through civilian review systems, reform (and 
scholarly) attention has been focused recently on concepts such as "com-
munity policing," as a way to make police forces more accountable to an 
undifferentiated community, or on improved training to address issues 
such as systemic racism. However, the optimism of the 1980s around 
these initiatives has given way to recognition that citizen complaint and 
review schemes largely have been unsuccessful at reducing police mis-
conduct or at increasing public accountability. 
In a collection of articles detailing police accountability systems 
around the world (including England, Australia, Canada, and United 
States cities including Chicago, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and San Francis-
co), Andrew Goldsmith identifies failed attempts to reduce misconduct or 
to increase community confidence in police accountability in those juris-
dictions. He notes that "the widely attributed failure of internal com-
plaints mechanisms reflects a loss of public confidence in the way in 
which the police have responded previously (or more to the point, have 
not responded) to expressions of citizen dissatisfaction and to evidence of 
misconduct more generally within their own ranks.'t22 
Other reform initiatives frequently advanced, such as community 
policing, better training, etc., are also being criticized for failing to touch 
the core of the problem. Paul Gordon points out that such reform efforts 
must be scrutinized closely, as often the "community relations officers" 
and "community liaison committees" that may form a part of community 
construed). The Los Angeles riots of May 1992 are beginning to evoke similar com-
mentary in the popular press, and the media are identifying the parallels. See, e.g., 
Colin MacKenzie, Causes Similar, Temper Distinct; Technology May Have Changed 
Since Watts Erupted in 1965, But the Images of Racial Inequality in Los Angeles Re-
main the Same, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, May 2, 1992, at A12. Politicians in both 
Canada and the United States draw the same parallels (although they are criticized for 
doing so for self-serving purposes). David Olive, THE GLOBE AND MAIL, May 9, 
1992, at D4. Racial violence has been hijacked by community leaders to serve their 
own cynical ends. (Prime Minister) Brian Mulroney snapped at the chance to draw a 
parallel between the L.A. riots and the Refonn Party's agenda of limiting immigration 
and dismantling multicultural programs, stopping just short of lumping (Refonn Party 
leader) Preston Manning in with Daryl Gates. (George Bush was criticized for using 
the riots as an opportunity to "trash" the social refonn agendas of Democratic presi-
dents "who held office before most of the rioters were born.") 
22. COMPLAINTS AGAINST POUCE, supra note 5, at 15-61, 73-83, 227-63. See also 
Dawn Currie, Walter DeKeseredy & Brian Maclean, Reconstituting Social Order and 
Social Control: Police Accountability in Canada, 2:1 J. HUM. JUST. 29, 33-37 (1990). 
The authors identify the failure of both the police to respond internally to misconduct 
and of scholars to address police intransigence on the issue. They argue for the use 
of locally conducted and controlled victimization surveys to determine satisfaction with 
policing and to infonn local police community liaison panels in a "left Realist model" 
of criminology. 
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policing initiatives are merely add-ons that only make policing more 
intrusive. He also challenges the panacea of "improved training" as well, 
concerned that often that training focuses on the failures of the policed to 
have adequate knowledge or skills to understand their place and role in 
the larger society. This premise produces training that teaches that un-
comprehending and ignorant ethno-cultural minorities deserve tolerance 
for their failings, thus locating this approach within, not against, rac-
ism.23 That is, it teaches that minorities, rather than police attitudes, 
cause the tension. 
These failures, and this loss of confidence, reflect at the very least a 
failure to understand the entrenched nature of misconduct as a product of 
a police culture actively sustained by the broader culture. Instead, many 
reform initiatives have been blinded by myths and fallacies that are fun-
damental to policing, as it is and as it has been practiced for a very long 
time, and foiled by a resistance to external pressures and insights that is a 
fundamental tenet of the police culture everywhere. Works describing, if 
not critiquing, "police culture" are widely available24 and will not be 
replicated here. Instead, some of the fallacies about misconduct will be 
critiqued, and the role of misconduct within the broader culture will be 
examined, in order to replace a common sense appreciation of police 
misconduct with a critical one. 
A. THE "BAD APPLE" MYTH 
If we have made The Street, then we have also made the 
Street Cop. Whatever the street cop does, he does it in our names 
and in accordance with the principles and laws we have caused, 
through our energy or our apathy, to be instituted and enforced. It 
follows that his defeats are our defeats, his sins are our sins, and 
his grace is our grace.25 
Reform initiatives that assume that the basic operation is sound and 
merely needs some enhancement or fine tuning to respond to contempo-
rary demands also assume that what misconduct occurs is isolated and 
exceptional, the misdeed of the rare "bad apple." This common sense 
fallacy is damaging to both police officers and to affected communities as 
it neither solves the problem nor speaks to the day-to-day realities of 
23. Paul Gordon, Community Policing: Toward the Local Police State?, in LAW, 
ORDER AND TIlE AUTHORITARIAN STATE 121-23 (Phil Scraton ed., 1987). See also 
discussion supra note 22. The commentators present consistent definitions of the prob-
lem (lack of police accountability) but advance different solutions. 
24. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. 
25. CARSTEN STROUD, THE BLUE WALL: STREET COPS IN CANADA, prologue 
(1983). 
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either group. Police officers resent what they take to be uninformed inter-
ference. The community continues to be frustrated as it seeks accountabil-
ity. It is not helpful or honest simply to consider the issue as a question 
of police deviance; the wider social context in which police culture and 
structures operate is equally implicated. 
When policing is seen as an inevitable and necessary evil, it is very 
difficult even to suggest making fundamental changes to policing models, 
let alone to achieve them. Fear of crime and violence puts pressure on 
police services for protection and maintenance of a stable social order. 
Unquestioning adherence to the belief that the police do their work fairly, 
effectively, and without unlawful violence or bias is the price to be paid 
for this protection. More specifically, as a particular order is sought to 
be maintained, police officers are recruited and rewarded as its unques-
tioned standard-bearers. 
The delegation of responsibility for "order" or "stability" to the police 
is often believed to be basic to the contemporary policing function. 
Werner Petterson, for example, refers to the disparate interpretations of 
social order, from various sectors of the community, that the police are 
asked to maintain as basically reflecting the "prevailing moral consensus 
of society.,,26 However, the police have been given (or have taken upon 
themselves) an impossible task in communities where such consensus 
does not truly exist. However, the belief in such a consensus preserves 
and fosters a policing status quo. More critically, Richard Ericson de-
scribes the interaction between the goal (preservation of a status quo) and 
the action (assumption of a consensus) and observes that 
the police have defined, and had defined for them, a mandate so 
broad that it includes responsibility for crime control, other devi-
ance control, and ultimately social order. The police have taken 
on this responsibility for social processes that are beyond the 
possibility of anyone group's control in that they are embedded 
in the social, cultural, political and economic structures of soci-
ety.27 
Steven Box offers an even more pointed explanation for the relation-
ship of police crime to the needs of the wider society. He argues that 
there is a level of police misconduct - in the questioning of dangerous 
suspects, for example - that has been accepted by both the police and 
the public as a "necessary evil" in the exercise of their duties. Thus only 
the rare exception is considered in practical terms to be unacceptable.28 
26. Petterson, supra note 7, at 265. 
27. Richard V. Ericson, Rules for Police Deviance, in ORGANIZATIONAL POLICE 
DEVIANCE: ITS STRUCTURE AND CONTROL, supra note 20, at 83-110. 
28. Box, supra note 18, at 80. 
* 
, Ii 
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The relationship is complex. At one level, the myth of the police as even-
handed, even-tempered protectors of community values operates to mask 
the existence of any but the most rare and exceptional misconduct. At the 
same time, at a more "worldly" level, a degree of misconduct is tolerated, 
even expected, as the police fulfill the subtext of their mandate: to do 
society'S "dirty work" in the way they see fit. 
Many institutions contribute to the belief that whatever the police do, 
and however they do it, must be "okay." The ideology of the rule of law, 
of fairness and due process, for example, acts to cloak police work in an 
aura of legitimacy. An assumption that is implicit in accepting and sup-
porting the exceptional power to use force and invasive measures that has 
been granted to the police is that the power they wield in enforcing the 
criminal law is bounded and contained by strict limitations and ultimate 
accountability in a court of law in accordance with the requirements of 
due process.29 When this legitimacy is challenged by evidence of police 
corruption or abuse of authority, a form of cognitive dissonance results 
and transmutes that evidence into palatable forms. What is palatable is a 
restricted and essentially non-threatening perception of the scope and 
nature of police misconduct. 
The common result of community-initiated complaints, for example, 
is that despite overwhelming evidence that police misconduct is a system-
ic problem, both the community and the police are made comfortable 
believing that misconduct, if it is acknowledged at all, is nothing more 
than the isolated incidence of misbehavior by "bad apples.,,3o The falla-
cies inherent in this perception are numerous. Police misconduct encom-
passes a wide range of acts and omissions, from securing and maintaining 
convictions of innocent people and the unjustified use of excessive force 
to overpolicing and harassment of minorities and systemic failures to 
respond adequately to woman-battering. With a definition of misconduct 
that makes the connections between these phenomena, neither the harm it 
causes nor its nature can be dismissed as merely isolated aberrant con-
29. Herbert Packer first set out the tension between "order" and "due process." 
HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968). Doreen 
McBarnet's study of the British criminal trial process effectively exposes the disso-
nance between the "due process" ideal and reality. DOREEN McBARNET, CONVICTION: 
LAW, THE STATE, AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE 1-78 (1981). 
30. ERICSON, supra note 16, at 97-101, identifies the use of internal discipline rules 
and procedures to maintain the belief that misconduct is limited to "bad apples" both 
within the police culture itself and, of course, in the community at large. See also 
Box, supra note 18. This comforting belief was manifested in Toronto by Metro 
Chairman Alan Tonks' refusal to attend an anti-racism rally held in the wake of the 
May 4, 1992 riots. He is reported as saying: "The police force is not a racist institu-
tion. Some individuals are, but there are checks and balances on them." Jack Lakey 
and Michael Tenszen, 300 Police Corral Crowd, THE TORONTO STAR, May 8, 1992, 
at AI. 
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duct. 
Some questionable conduct, such as a "fleeing felon" shooting, re-
ceives substantial media attention, forcing the wider community to ac-
knowledge the incident. Much more remains hidden, denied, and ignored. 
The experience of Parkdale Community Legal Services in its represen-
tation of poor people supports the view that all police misconduct is in 
part a product of the extent to which we as a society have been stripped 
of our personal and collective responsibility for the maintenance of social 
harmony in exchange for the production and reproduction of an orde~l 
that is manifested in an unequal and oppressive status quo. 
In this context, all police misconduct is systemic, the product of 
institutionalized policies and practices, both officially and unofficially 
sanctioned. Whether it contributes to a wrongful conviction, a wrongful 
injury and death, or to further isolation and despair for those whose trust 
is abused or whose claim for protection has been ignored, the utter ba-
nality of the attitudes and practices that produce the troubling claims of 
misconduct needs to be understood. That understanding then becomes 
available to deconstruct the quite valid claim that much misconduct is 
either not deliberate or was not maliciously motivated. 
The contention that all "cops" are dishonest, brutal bigots is as falla-
cious as the more widely held belief that "our cops are tops" and only 
occasionally fall into human error. Both propositions contribute to the 
maintenance of a police culture that presents an almost unbreachable face 
toward critics and reformers. On the other hand, a reform initiative, such 
as the PCLS project, that rejects these myths and works to expose the 
fallacies through community education and outreach, acts against this 
trend. 
B. POLICE METHODS: THE END JUSTIFIES (AND DETERMINES) 
THE MEANS 
The end of contemporary policing - the maintenance of a mythical 
"order"32 - both defines and preordains the means utilized. The pursuit 
of an elusive state of order justifies police action that keeps people in 
their place using whatever means are necessary. The means that attract 
the most public attention, such as extortion of confessions, perjury, ma-
31. See discussion of the police "reproduction of order" role, supra notes 26-30. 
32. A compliant workforce, a large (and compliant) surplus pool of labor to draw 
upon, and clean, orderly neighborhoods with consistent and rising property values are 
the "American dream." The police role in maintaining the dream is sometimes overt, 
as in police intervention in labor disputes or the "war on drugs," infra note 54, but 
often covert, sustaining a hetero-patriarchy in the prosecution of prostitutes and other 
deviant women, infra notes 49-53, a reluctance to assist certain classes of women in 
domestic disputes, infra notes 62-63, and reinforcement of racist stereotypes, infra 
note 60. 
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nipulation of witnesses and evidence, reliance on bigoted stereotypes, and 
the use of excessive force, may result in the death, injury, or imprison-
ment of innocent people. These acts differ only in degree, however, from 
the unspoken canon of police work inculcated with the donning of the 
uniform and encouraged and nurtured every day of a police officer's life: 
secrecy, authoritarianism, an exaggerated respect for "order," and a cyni-
cal reliance On force to respond to anything that does not fit within that 
rigid model, such as a young black male driving an expensive car in a 
white neighborhood. 
Police work is inherently conservative, in the literal sense. Promotion 
is hierarchical, loyalty to colleagues is unquestioned, and the use of force 
is the primary directive. Techniques of investigation and crime control 
rely on perceptions of "who doesn't fit" and reinforce cynicism, authori-
tarianism, and stereotyped thinking. An aggressive and courageous re-
sponse to danger and a capacity to dominate any policing situation are 
inculcated and reinforced daily and ensure police isolation and cynicism, 
as non-police officers are seen as wimps and fools who need protection 
or as criminal "scum." Misconduct issues are thus structural and not 
amenable to redress through training or recruiting alone - and not sim-
ply caused by "bad apples.'033 
Each time a community insists that street prostitution or drug traffick-
ing be dealt with firmly by the police, i.e. "Dirty Harry" is needed,34 the 
result is that the wider society has sent the police a clear message. When 
the "rule of law" conflicts with an overriding need for social order,35 the 
rule of law must serve the pursuit of order, rather than justice.36 The re-
sult of the ambiguity of this message has been the development of a 
seemingly impenetrable arsenal of police-specific techniques shrouded in 
legal rhetoric used to avoid accountability and change and to respond 
33. John Sewell identifies "danger" and "authority" as the two most powerful forces 
instrumental in shaping police responses to people and situations. SEWELL, supra note 
20, at 175-99. For a similar (although more sympathetic to police officers) analysis of 
police work, criminologist Claude Vincent identifies behavioral tendencies fundamental 
to the police role as: secrecy, cynicism, stereotyped thinking (reinforced by training to 
be acutely observant of that which does not fit), and decisiveness. CLAUDE M. VIN-
CENT, POLICE OFFICER 117-67 (1990). 
34. Box, supra note 18, at 81, identifies the "Dirty Harry problem" as the mysti-
fication of police crime into a necessity if the police are to "get their man" and 
protect us. 
35. Such needs include reassurance that Irish Republican Army terrorist bombers 
have been apprehended or that the "drug menace" is being dealt with. See discussions 
infra notes 40-44, 54. 
36. There is some sign that this preference for order is changing. In a discussion 
of the release of Annie Maguire and her family in the last of the IRA pub-bombing 
wrongful-conviction cases, infra notes 40-44, the role of the courts is examined. John 
Gray, The Crime of Being Irish: Uncomfortable Questions About the "Finest Justice 
System in the World," THE GLOBE AND MAll.., Mar. 15, 1991. 
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defensively to critics and reformers. The manifestations are both public, 
as in the case of police-induced wrongful convictions, and private, as in 
selective enforcement and harassment of particular communities. It is 
important to draw the connections between them, as they reveal different 
aspects of a tightly constructed culture that successfully resists any 
change and, indeed, will change only when it is in our own best interests. 
1. Wrongful convictions 
Police malfeasance (and judicial reluctance to recognize it) has played 
an important role in most wrongful-conviction cases throughout the com-
mon law world. The scenario is always similar: an unpopular or power-
less accused, a heinous crime, a community demanding action, and a 
police force determined to use any means necessary to provide it. Indeed, 
in almost all cases of wrongful conviction, except perhaps those caused 
by honestly mistaken eyewitness identification, police misconduct plays a 
central role in the crafting of a case designed to achieve a conviction. 
Once an arrest has been made, the police conclusion that they "have their 
man" justifies - indeed mandates - the production and distortion of 
evidence to achieve a conviction. The possibility of an unpopular or 
stereotyped defendant achieving a fair trial in these circumstances is 
slight indeed. 
These cases frequently capture media attention.37 The reversal in Los 
Angeles of the wrongful convictions of Clarence Chance and Benny 
Powell was covered quite extensively in Toronto. News accounts report 
that the men were convicted of the 1975 killing of a sheriffs deputy. 
New evidence from a New Jersey private investigator, Jim McCloskey, 
revealed that police withheld from the defense the fact that a prosecution 
witness, a jailhouse informant, had implicated two other people as well 
and had failed two lie detector tests, and that three other prosecution wit-
nesses had been pressured by police to testify falsely against Chance. Los 
Angeles police chief Daryl Gates, one of the original investigators, held a 
press conference to support the conviction despite the revelations.38 
A few days later, another Toronto newspaper reported on the wrong-
ful conviction for robbery in Los Angeles in 1924 of discharged soldier 
James Preston. Preston was convicted on the basis of an incorrect identi-
37. The phenomenon generally, and as exhibited through individual cases, is seen as 
newsworthy. For examples of stories about the phenomenon, see Thomas Gabor and 
Julian Roberts, How the Innocent End Up Behind Bars, THE TORONTO STAR, Feb. 12, 
1992, at A2l. Jim Middlemiss, Guilty Until Proven Innocent, CANADIAN LAWYER 20 
(Nov. 1991) (on file with author), cites a (United States) Criminal Justice Research 
Center study that one-half to one percent of all convictions are of innocent people. 
38. Sheryl Stolberg, Pair Wrongly Jailed on Murder Charge, THE TORONTO STAR, 
Mar. 26, 1992, at 18. 
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fication and misleading police fingerprint evidence. The police investiga-
tors are described as having dropped a (false) tip to the presiding judge 
that fingerprints had been found that matched Preston's. A police finger-
print examiner, disturbed by this deception, kept looking for the person 
who matched the prints, finally finding him (a look-alike for Preston) 
after Preston, who had been sentenced to eleven years, had spent eighteen 
months in jail. 39 
However, some wrongful convictions do raise issues regarding sys-
temic problems with police behavior. None have so challenged percep-
tions about the criminal justice system as the overturning of Irish Repub-
lican Army (IRA) bombing cases in Britain. The IRA had claimed credit 
for the bombing of pubs in Guildford, Birmingham, and Manchester that 
killed scores of innocent bystanders in the 1 970s. Public demands for 
arrests and convictions were naturally loud. These demands may well 
have contributed to the wrongful conviction and imprisonment of inno-
cent men and women in all the pub-bombing cases: the "Guildford 
Four,,,40 the "Birmingham Six,''''1 and the "Maguire Seven,',42 to name 
the most famous. 
In order to ensure convictions, the British police used unlawful 
means. They extorted false confessions and then perjured themselves to 
ensure the admissibility of those statements in court; they manipulated 
and suborned witnesses, including experts; and they centered their investi-
gati ve efforts on building a false case rather than detecting the actual 
bombers, some of whom remain at large. Although appeals to the courts 
were initially fruitless, a massive media campaign, diligent continuing 
39. The story appeared in a "Crime Flashbacks" column and balances the 
investigator's misconduct against the integrity of the fingerprint examiner. Max Haines, 
He Spent Time in San Quentin For Crime He Didn't Commit, THE SATURDAY SUN, 
Mar. 29, 1992, at F94 (on file with author). 
40. Three young men and a young woman were brutally interrogated and forced to 
sign false confessions, which amounted to the only substantive evidence against them. 
Even in the face of reliable evidence from the real IRA bombers, the authorities 
maintained that the "Four" were also guilty (revising the number of "bombers" in-
volved) until evidence of police perjury and alteration of evidence was uncovered. 
GRANT McKEE AND Ross FRANEY, TIME BOMB: IRISH BOMBERS, ENGLISH JUSTICE, 
AND TIlE GUILDFORD FOUR (on file with author); Editorial, Lessons from Guildford, 
139 NEW LAW JOURNAL 1441 (1989); R. v. Richardson et al, Court of Appeal, Oct. 
19, 1990 (The Times) (on file with author). 
41. The pattern in the Guildford Four case was replicated in Birmingham and set 
out in painful detail in CHRIS MULLIN, ERROR OF JUDGEMENT: THE TRUTII ABOUT 
TIlE BIRMINGHAM BOMBINGS (revised 1990); R. v. Callaghan and others, 1 ALL E.R. 
257 (Eng. C.A. 1988). 
42. An Irish housewife and her family living in Manchester were convicted on 
circumstantial evidence of conspiracy to injure and of preparation of the bombs used 
in the pub-bombing cases on circumstantial evidence. The police had failed to dis-
close significant evidence that ultimately utterly discredited their forensic case. Gray, 
supra note 36 (discussing the case of Annie Maguire and her family). 
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research, investigation, and pressure finally resulted in the reopening of 
their cases.43 
Police actions alone did not account for the convictions, of course. A 
judiciary unable or unwilling to acknowledge even the possibility of 
police malfeasance played an important role. The clearest expression of 
judicial attitudes toward allegations of police impropriety anywhere re-
mains Lord Denning's chilling comment in the Birmingham Six case that 
to permit a lawsuit against the police for their treatment of the accused 
would suggest it may be possible that the police had lied to put innocent 
men behind bars. He described this possibility as "an appalling vista" that 
he would not countenance.44 
A similar pattern of police misconduct and judicial blindness led to 
and sustained the wrongful conviction of a young Nova Scotian MicMac 
Indian, Donald Marshall, Jr., who spent eleven years in prison for the 
murder that he did not commit of a black youth. The introduction to a 
subsequent Royal Commission Inquiry demonstrates how easy it is to 
present someone as obviously guilty: 
When Donald Marshall, Jr., was convicted and sentenced to 
life imprisonment in 1971 for murdering Sandford William Seale, 
most observers of the day probably assumed it was a "routine" 
murder case, thoroughly investigated, conscientiously prosecuted 
and fairly adjudicated by appropriate authorities in the criminal 
justice system. 
The evidence seemed compelling enough. According to appar-
ently independent "eyewitnesses," two young men got into an 
argument in a Sydney park one night. One stabbed the other. He 
died. The eyewitnesses identified Marshall as the assailant and 
Seale as the victim. Little wonder it took a jury less than four 
hours to fmd Donald Marshall, Jr., guilty of murder. 
But despite all those seemingly reasonable assumptions, the 
reality, as we now know, is that Donald Marshall, Jr., did not 
murder Sandy Seale. He spent 11 years in prison for a crime he 
did not commit. 
What went wrong'ts 
43. See supra notes 40-42. All three cases have marked similarities. Susan Edwards, 
From Scapegoats to Sacrificial Lambs: The Guildford Four Affair, 139 NEW L.J. 1449 
(1989) (describing the campaign led by Lord Devlin and the implications of the ex-
tent of police perjury and brutality). 
44. McIlkenney v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands, 1 Q.B. 283 (Eng. C.A. 
1980), approved, Hunter v. Chief Constable of the West Midlands Police, A.C. 329 
(Eng. H.L. 1982). 
45. Foreward. ROYAL COMMISSION ON TIlE DONALD MARSHALL, JR., PROSECUTION: 
DIGEST OF FINDINGS AND REcOMMENDATIONS, VOL. 1, 1 (1989) (on file with author) 
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Racism was a factor in Donald Marshall's case, just as anti-Irish 
bigotry played a role in the IRA prosecutions. In the Marshall case this 
bias found expression in police failure to disclose relevant evidence to the 
defense and their suborning of witnesses to give perjured testimony. 
Teenage acquaintances of both Marshall and the victim were questioned 
repeatedly by police until they finally falsely identified Marshall as the 
killer. Their subsequent recantations (and earlier denials that Marshall was 
involved) were never disclosed to the defense. Nor was information from 
the real killer's daughter. Three years after Marshall's conviction, the 
daughter of Seale's actual killer, a middle-class, middle-aged white man 
named Roy Esbary, told a friend (who passed the information on to a 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police constable) that she had reported informa-
tion about her father being covered in blood the night of the murder. In-
formation that Esbary was confessing to the murder came to police atten-
tion from more than one source; constant pressure from Marshall's law-
yer, and ultimately the media, forced a new appeal.46 
Once again the courts were reluctant to acknowledge the role played 
by the police in the wrongful conviction. The Nova Scotia Court of Ap-
peal reluctantly overturned Marshall's conviction when the actual killer 
confessed; the court claimed that Marshall's conviction was his own 
fault.47 The appeal court's attitude and the complicity of prosecuting 
counsel, as much as the circumstances of the wrongful conviction itself, 
led to a Royal Commission Inquiry, which exonerated Marshall, ordered 
compensation to him, and named bigotry and complacency as the true 
authors of the injustice.48 
2. Selective enforcement: Sex, drugs and . 
Routine hidden incidents of misconduct have as powerful an impact 
on communities as do high-profile cases of wrongful conviction or vio-
lence. These routine incidents of misconduct reflect and reinforce race, 
class, and gender bias in a myriad of ways. The process of identifying 
[hereinafter MARSHALL COMMISSION]. Royal Commissions are Special Inquiries ordered 
by the Minister of Justice in Canada. The Marshall Commission included Chief Jus-
tice T. Alexander Hickman, Ass. Ch. J. Lawrence Poitras, and The Honourable Greg-
ory T. Evans (Fonner Chief Justice of the Ontario Supreme Court). 
46. MARSHALL COMMISSION, supra note 45, at 34-67. 
47. The court said, albeit while overturning the conviction, that any miscarriage of 
justice was more apparent than real. In attempting to defend himself against the 
charge of murder, Mr. Marshall admittedly committed perjury for which he could still 
be charged. The court did not doubt that Donald Marshall's untruthfulness throughout 
the affair contributed in large measure to his conviction. MARsHALL COMMISSION, 
supra note 45, at 117. 
48. MARSHALL COMMISSION, supra note 45. The seven-volume report is a damning 
indictment of systemic racism in the criminal justice system and of police and prose-
cutorial misconduct in securing and maintaining convictions at any cost. 
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and naming this covert malfeasance was central to the evolution of the 
peLS police reform project and is an essential step in any counter-hege-
monic strategy. 
Sex 
Police abuse of marginalized women, such as prostitutes, arises from 
and reproduces the classic whore/madonna stereotype. The police distin-
guish "good girls" from "bad" and use and abuse prostitutes because they 
are viewed as valueless women, available for the provision of sexual 
services to them as well as to clients, without any claim to even minimal 
protection. Police hassling, for information or on general principle, is 
almost a constant in the lives of street prostitutes and has been document-
ed in peLS files.49 More dramatic complaints of extortion of sexual ser-
vices by police officers are beginning to surface in Toronto and else-
where. In the course of representing a woman whom a police officer vic-
timized by requiring her to provide sexual services, peLS raised the 
broader question of assaults on prostitutes at a Public Inquiry into the 
internal affairs unit of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force.50 An offi-
cer known on the streets of Toronto as "sperm whale" has been reported 
as using his hand gun to extort oral sex from street prostitutes with impu-
nity.51 An Oakland police officer has been charged with kidnaping six 
women while on duty on his late-night shifts and forcing them to choose 
between submitting to sex acts or being arrested. 52 More serious alle-
gations have been made that the Sacramento police have been involved in 
the murder of prostitutes. The force has been reported as referring to the 
deaths of the prostitutes as "NIH - No Humans Involved," suggesting 
the depth of their dehumanizing stereotypes. 53 
Drugs 
It is critical to recognize, however, the double message that the com-
49. Elinor Whitmore, Police Enforcement of Street Prostitution (Dec. 1989) (unpub-
lished manuscript on file with the Intensive Programme in Poverty Law, Parkdale 
Community Legal Services!Osgoode Hall Law School). 
50. See Junger Inquiry, infra notes 127-30 and accompanying text. 
51. The evidence, complaints made by prostitutes about this officer, came out at the 
Junger Inquiry, infra notes 124-25. The complaints received media attention, but to 
date little else has been done. Glen Cooley, Charging Police Officers Too Risky for 
Prostitutes, Now, Oct. 31-Nov. 6, 1991, at 21; Andrew Duffy, Prostitutes Say Officer 
Extorts Sex, Probe Told, THE TORONTO STAR, Oct. 22, 1991, at A6. 
52. Associated Press, Oakland Cop Charged With Sexual Battery, Kidnapping, S.F. 
EXAMINER, Feb. 2, 1992, at B3. 
53. '''Sometimes we'd call them NIHs - no humans involved,' - police source, 
Sacramento Bee, October 7, 1990." Ann Nocenti, Crimes and Misdemeanours, LIES OF 
OUR TIMEs, Sept. 1991, at 11. 
i'i' w "n*'flf H'f 'IP! 
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munity sends to the police. For example, the "War on Drugs" campaign 
has very successfully prompted community demands for more police 
protection and action. The sense of order, of taking action, that a strong 
police presence evokes is not only welcomed, it is sought out. That the 
police intervention often affects primarily marginalized women, racial 
minorities, and people with AIDS is recognized, but that recognition does 
not result in changes in policies or behavior. 
The tension between the community desire for law and order and 
police mistreatment of marginalized groups take many forms. For exam-
ple, PCLS' work with low-income tenants uncovered "block busting" by 
unscrupulous real estate developers in the Parkdale community of Toron-
to. The developers encouraged drug use in a building and then called for 
a police crackdown to "clean out the building" to avert rent control and 
rental protection legislation by emptying the building. 54 More common-
ly, residents concerned about the presence of drug use and drug traffick-
ing in their building or neighborhood are offered remedies such as a 
heightened police presence and mandatory evictions of residents even 
suspected of drug infractions. The media increasingly appear to be ambiv-
alent about these measures and supportive of the PCLS policy of oppos-
ing the evictions and searching for community solutions, an approach that 
has informed the police reform project as well.ss 
III. THE ROLE OF LAW 
Police culture alone is insufficient to explain police misconduct or, 
equally important, to understand why it persists seemingly unchecked. 
The context in which misconduct manifests itself and is dealt with is of 
equal importance, and the law is a significant part of that context. 
"Law,,,s6 both normatively and structurally, is as essential to police offi-
54. Catherine Milne, The War On Drugs: A Call for the White Flag (April 1990) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Intensive Programme in Poverty Law, 
Parkdale Community Legal Services/Osgoode Hall Law School). 
55. Others also attempt to question the wisdom of these tactics. See, e.g., Rosie 
DiManno, Harsh Drug-Fighting Measures Should Be Dropped, THE TORONTO STAR, 
Dec. 17, 1990; Bruce Livesay, A Dangerous Anti Drug-War Weapon, THE GLOBE & 
MAIL, Feb. 19, 1990; Royston James, Proposed Drug Evictions, Curfew Need Furthur 
Study, Tonks Says, THE TORONTO STAR, Sept. 29, 1990. Community-initiated solutions 
might include drug counseling, education, or the eradication of poverty. 
56. I use the term in the sense that critical legal theorists have used it in their 
program of deconstruction. See Alan Hunt, The Critique of lAw: What is Critical 
about Critical Legal Theory?, 14 J.L & Soc. 5 (1987). It is primarily the criminal 
law that is at issue, both because it is central to policing and because of the power 
of its message of control with '1ustice." Herbert Packer was instrumental to analyses 
of the purpose of the criminal law, with his distinction between "due process" and 
"crime control" models. PACKER, supra note 28, at 283. British criminologist Doreen 
McBarnet brings a more stringent analysis, exposing the frailties (and the deadly 
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cers as it is to lawyers. 57 The enforcement of laws by a police force free 
from political interference and answerable only to "the law" is seen by 
many as the sacred trust of the police in a democracy. The doctrine of 
"constabulary independence" is widely cited by the police as an answer to 
demands for more civilian control and is sometimes expressed in terms of 
"keeping politics out of policing," a proposition that obscures the political 
foundation of the policing function.58 
This powerful truism has frequently resulted in reform strategies 
dominated and circumscribed by legal norms and limitations in result, if 
not in content or focus.59 Even when the object of a reform strategy has 
been to change attitudes and practices through a combination of media 
campaigns, organizing efforts, and lobbying, the most common responses 
have been narrow and legalistic, such as criminal charges against officers 
for excessive force in the execution of their duty, minor changes in legis-
lation governing complaints against the police, and directives concerning 
wife-assault. These outcomes have been markedly unsuccessful in 
changing police attitudes and practices. The police are almost inevitably 
exonerated of this type of criminal charge,60 complaint mechanisms 
serious function) of the ideology of fairness in the administration of criminal justice. 
McBARNET, supra note 29. Ericson, in addition to his other work, documents the 
dissonance between the "rights" of accused persons and the reality of the operation of 
law. RICHARD V. ERICSON AND PATRICIA M. BARANEK, THE ORDERING OF JUSTICE: 
A STUDY OF ACCUSED PERSONS AS DEPENDANTS IN THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 41-75 
(1982). 
57. Ericson, supra note 27, notes that the criminal law is the police officer's tool 
in reproducing order. It is a resource, not a restraint. This function of "law" as it re-
lates to lawyers has been analyzed frequently by students of both law and sociology. 
See ROGER COTTERELL, Professional Guardianship of Law, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF 
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION (1984). 
58. COMPLAINTS AGAINST POUCE, supra note 5, at 1-2. The idea is criticized as 
fraudulent by K.C. Palmer in SHEARING, supra note 20, at 181-84. It is an idea with 
considerable power, however, as evidenced in a recent charge for theft brought against 
a reporter and those who leaked a copy of the upcoming federal budget (retrieved 
from a copy room). R. v. Appleby et al., 78 C.R. (3d) 282 (Ont. Prov. Ct. 1990) (on 
file with author). The charges were stayed on the basis that the officer who laid them 
had no real subjective "belief' that a crime had occurred but laid them from "exces-
sive zeal." Although a case was not made out for either the reality of or reasonable 
grounds for perception of political interference in use of the criminal process, because 
no evidence was led that the influence came from the "top down," this is a "blind 
eye" case in many ways. 
59. The failure of litigation and legal strategies to either "hear" clients or actually 
achieve any real benefits has been extensively critiqued in poverty law circumstances. 
See, e.g., Rand E. Rosenblatt, Legal Entitlement and Welfare Benefits, in THE POU-
TICS OF LAW 262 (David Kairys ed., 1982); Diana Pearce, Welfare is Not for Wom-
en: Toward a Model of Advocacy to Meet the Needs of Women in Poverty, 19 
CLEARINGHOUSE REVIEW 412 (1985). 
60. Media accounts of this type of charge against police officers frequently summa-
rize the history of similar charges. The history, of course, may be used for different 
purposes: either to confirm that the police were justified in their conduct or to con-
*_1 & 
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quickly become bureaucratized and ineffective, and police protection for 
victims such as battered women remain illusory. One can trace the failure 
of these responses to reach the structural roots of police misconduct to 
the "legalization" of the various issues. 
A. LEGALIZING THE ISSUES 
The response of legal institutions to social issues such as police mis-
conduct is essentially individualized and rule-driven, and thus highly 
effective at containing and directing public demands and concerns. More-
over, the response of "law" has often served a legitimating function for 
the police and their governing authorities. It has been a common strategy, 
for example, to permit, if not encourage, the "legalizing" of an issue as a 
means of containing and limiting actual change.61 This tendency oper-
ates both as a function of the ideological role of law and in more instru-
mental ways through the interaction of client (officer or complainant), 
lawyer, and tribunal (court or disciplinary body). The use of a legal mod-
el of dispute-resolution always means that conflicts are removed from 
their contexts, cleansed and analyzed into legally remedial "issues." These 
re-framed conflicts are then resolved in a forum where the police are very 
much at home: a courtroom. It is not surprising, then, that whatever vic-
tories are achieved do not produce substantive change. Three seemingly 
unrelated concerns, and police response to them, illustrate the point: wife-
assault, police brutality, and complaints against the police. 
1. Wife-assault: Private violence 
Police reluctance to interfere in domestic disturbances in order to 
protect battered women has been a long-standing problem.62 However, 
fInn that the courts are unwilling to act against this police conduct. See, e.g., Carl 
Chancellor, Sadly, L.A. Verdict Was No Surprise, THE TORONTO STAR, May 1, 1992 
(writing from Akron, Ohio, Chancellor details other acquittals); a summary of some of 
the acquittals of Metro Toronto offIcers since 1980 was printed as a sidebar to the 
acquittal of the offIcers in the Wade Lawson shooting, infra note 70; Metro Officers 
Cleared Since 1980, THE TORONTO STAR, Apr. 9, 1992, at A32. Of ten offIcers 
charged with causing a serious injury, none have been convicted. 
61. Concern with the limits of fonnal justice and fonnal-dispute resolution mecha-
nisms spawned the search for alternatives. Alternative dispute resolution has also been 
critiqued, but that critique has not rehabilitated fonnal mechanisms. See RICHARD 
ABEL, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF INFORMAL JUSTICE: THE POLmCs OF INFORMAL 
JUSTICE, VOL. I (1982); Maureen Cain, Beyond Informal Justice, 9 CONTEMP. CRISES 
335 (1985). 
62. Historical analysis is revealing about both the root of these attitudes and their 
longevity. See generally Jill Radford, Women and Policing: Contradictions Old and 
New, in WOMEN, POLICING, AND MALE VIOLENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 13-
45 (Jalna Hamner, Jill Radford & Elizabeth A. Stanko eds., 1989); Linda Gordon, 
Family Violence, Feminism, and Social Control, in LABOUR AND LoVE: WOMEN'S 
EXPERIENCES OF HOME AND TIlE FAMILY 1850-1940 (Jane Lewis ed., 1986) (on fIle 
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the transformation of the battered women's movement, from a grass-roots 
movement working for systemic social change into a group of lobbyists 
struggling for legalistic responses, provides a classic example of the legal-
ization of a complex social issue. As government at all levels and police 
were forced to address wife-battering, broad demands were narrowed by 
these agencies into the criminal law paradigm. Ultimately, as government 
was forced by political pressure to acknowledge the problem, and to 
express willingness to find solutions, it did so by committing the resourc-
es of the criminal justice system. The government pledge to eradicate 
wife-battering was thus expressed in the powerful slogan, "Wife Assault: 
It's a Crime," a response that served to silence the demand that violence 
against women be addressed systematically. Instead, directives and regula-
tions, such as "mandatory charge - no drop" policies, were implement-
ed.63 This narrow, legalistic response is at best inadequate. For many 
women, such a response offers no remedy at all. The experience of PCLS 
students working with battered women, particularly minority women, is 
that access to community supports is far more relevant than legal solu-
tions. Indeed, many minority women are reluctant to bring the police into 
their homes at all. 64 
2. Police use of deadly force: Public violence 
The demand that charges be brought against police officers who use 
excessive or deadly force in the execution of their duty has left the public 
disillusioned and the underlying problem of police brutality unredressed. 
The 1979 police shooting of Jamaican immigrant Albert Johnson, disori-
ented, when he was in despair over previous encounters with police bru-
tality and armed only with a garden tool, galvanized Toronto's black 
with author); Sentences Are Not Severe - Staff Inspector Archibald Discusses the 
Subject - Women's Loyalty to Husbands, THE TORONTO STAR, Feb. 27, 1992, at A6 
(regarding the treatment in the Toronto court system of men who beat their wives). 
63. Gillian Walker has traced the phenomenon in Canada in a discourse analysis. 
She analyzes the claims of the battered women's movement from the 1970s and the 
parliamentary hearings where those claims were met with legal remedies (although 
legal remedies were initially only a small part of the demands). GILLIAN A. WALKER, 
FAMILY VIOLENCE AND TIlE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT (1990). In the United States, this 
"legalization" was more overt. A lawsuit for negligence in providing protection to a 
battered woman was central to United States strategies addressing policing and wife-
assault. Kathleen J. Ferraro, The Legal Response to Woman Battering in the United 
States, in WOMEN, POLICING, AND MALE VIOLENCE: INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES 
supra note 62, at 155-84. 
64. Dianne Martin and Janet Mosher, The Criminal Sanction and Domestic Vio-
lence, a report submitted to the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of 
Canada (analysis of the response of minority women to police intervention). See also 
Currie, supra note 17. Minority women who have both experienced and witnessed 
racism from the police are placed in a difficult position. They wish safety but do not 
wish to subject their partners to police racism or violence. 
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community into action. Most of the public outcry centered on a call for 
criminal charges against the officers responsible for the shooting.6s How-
ever, the dead man's widow and children also brought a civil suit.66 
This legalized strategy primarily benefitted the police; the officers were 
acquitted, and the lawsuit was settled in a secret agreement with no ad-
mission of liability.67 The opportunity to explore the systemic issues 
raised by the case, specifically racism and the treatment of mentally ill 
persons, was lost. 
Since the Johnson case, police shootings of black youths have contin-
ued out of proportion to the percentage of blacks in the population. 
Toronto's black community continues to call for criminal charges against 
offending officers and urges other reforms, ranging from increased minor-
ity hiring by the police and better policing to a more accountable civilian 
review system and the criminalization of racism. Predictably, the response 
to the demand for these reforms has been painstakingly slow and limited 
in scope. Moreover, the filing of criminal charges against the offending 
officers has been ineffective in bringing about real change. To date, no 
officer in Toronto has been convicted of a serious criminal offense in 
connection with shooting a black suspect.68 On the contrary, the police 
seem to have grown even more skilled at defusing public concern. Re-
cently in Toronto Marion Neal, a black youth, was shot by police when 
he refused to get out of his car. He had been caught by a speed trap and 
stopped by P.C. Rapson, a traffic officer, who justified the shooting by 
claiming that he believed the youth was going for a gun. During the trial, 
the evidence revealed that the young man was unarmed and had been 
reaching for the hand brake. The victim's criminal record featured strong-
ly in the case (although the identity of the victim was unknown to the 
officer at the time of the shooting), in a successful tactic designed to 
associate black criminality with police risk.69 
65. Each story on the case ended with the demand for charges. Barbara Keddy, 
Widow Recalls Sequence of Events That Led to Shooting, THE GWBE AND MAIL, 
Aug. 2, 1979, at A2. 
66. Police efforts to have the suit dismissed following the police officers' acquittal 
failed. Johnson Kin Can Proceed With Civil Suit, THE GWBE AND MAIL, Oct. 7, 
1981, at 5. 
67. Kirk Makin, Widow Gets Settlement From Police in Shooting, THE GWBE AND 
MAIL, Feb. 13. 1988, at AI. By holding the details of the settlement secret, the po-
lice - individually and collectively - avoid accountability. While an individualized 
strategy such as a lawsuit may well result in a settlement that is acceptable to an 
individual plaintiff, the result obtained does not serve broader reform goals. 
68. See supra note 60. 
69. The headlines tell the story: Peter Edwards, Teen in Car Threatened Constable, 
Police Told, THE TORONTO STAR, Oct. 24, 1991, at AlO; Constable's Lawyer Calls 
No Witnesses, THE TORONTO STAR, Oct. 25, 1991, at AlO; Officer Shot Youth in a 
Rage, Jury Told, THE TORONTO STAR, Oct. 29, 1991, at AS; Officer Could Have 
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A few months later two officers were acquitted of murder and fIrearm 
charges in a neighboring municipality. Wade Lawson, a seventeen-year-
old unarmed black youth with no criminal record, was shot and killed by 
police on December 8, 1988. He was shot in the back of the head, police 
bullets shattering the rear window of the stolen car he was driving. An 
all-white jury accepted the defense that the officers fIred in self-defense 
and were fearful because of Lawson's failure to stop and his acceleration 
away.70 Days after the Rodney King demonstrations and the shooting of 
another black youth,71 the Attorney General announced that there were 
no grounds on which to appeal and that the acquittal would stand.72 
3. Police discipline: Whose tool is it? 
The failure of public complaint and internal discipline regimes to 
change police behavior73 provides a further illustration of the inadequacy 
of reform strategies that concentrate on legalistic solutions. The police are 
trained to view the criminal law as their "tool. ,,74 This perception sus-
Killed Teen If He Wished, Judge Tells Jury, THE TORONTO STAR, Oct. 30, 1991, at 
A2; Officer Cleared in Teen Shooting, THE TORONTO STAR, Oct. 31, 1991, at AI; 
Province Considers Appealing Rapson Case, THE TORONTO STAR, Oct. 31, 1991, at 
A6; Relieved Police Officers Call Acquittal "Great News," THE TORONTO STAR, Oct. 
31, 1991, at A6; Officer's Family Had Faith He Would Be Acquitted, THE TORONTO 
STAR, Nov. I, 1991, at AS; Paula Todd, Why Rapson Case Went to Trial, THE To-
RONTO STAR, Nov. I, 1991, at AS; Rapson's Acquittal Won't Be Appealed, THE To-
RONTO STAR, Nov. 28, 1991, at A7. 
The youth's subsequent brushes with the law were treated as news. See, e.g., 
New Charges Laid Against Teen Shot by Constable, THE TORONTO STAR, Nov. 6, 
1991, at A5; Shot Teen Jailed 90 Days for Trafficking in Drugs, THE TORONTO 
STAR, Nov. 28, 1991, at A7. 
70. Farrell Crook, Officers Cleared in Fatal Shooting of Teenager in Car, THE 
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 9, 1992, at AI; Bob Mitchell and Farrell Crook, Officers 
Cleared in Lawson Death; Slain Teenager's Mother "Disappointed" by Verdict, THE 
TORONTO STAR, Apr. 9, 1992, at A7; Farrell Crook, Grieving Mother Prays Slain Son 
Will Get Justice, THE TORONTO STAR, Apr. 11, 1992, at A4 (Evelyn Lennon-Lyon 
describes her son Wade Lawson as "sweet" and "respectful," not the thief he was 
portrayed as at the officer's trial; his mother said Wade Lawson had choices: he was 
an accomplished athlete who could have made a career of playing basketball). 
71. See supra note 4. 
72. The Attorney General indicated he would be seeking changes in the laws 
around the right of police to use deadly force in "fleeing felon" cases and as a need-
ed reform in jury-selection procedures that permitted the all-white jury. Paula Todd, 
Rapson's Acquittal Won't be Appealed, THE TORONTO STAR, Nov. 28, 1991, at A7 
(Attorney General Howard Hampton says province has no grounds to appeal the ac-
quittals of the officers in the Wade Lawson shooting); Farrell Crook and Bob Mitch-
ell, "I Just Can't Believe It," Mother Says, THE TORONTO STAR, May 9, 1992, at 
A4. The prosecution may appeal a verdict of not guilty only on an error of law. 
CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, R.S.C. ch. C-46, § 676(1)(a) (1985). 
73. See supra note 18. 
74. Ericson, supra note 27. At the same time, the rule of law is taken for granted 
as the formal standard against which "deviance" should be measured and judged. 
,n 
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tains them in their work and their efforts to deflect public criticism and 
demands for public accountability. It encourages the arrogant belief that 
as members of the police force they are immune from criminal liability, 
and it dominates the structure and procedures governing the disposition of 
citizen complaints. Although the police are frequently bitter about the 
"protection" granted to accused people by the criminal law,7s they ex-
hibit an almost evangelical belief in the criminal trial process when it 
frees a police officer who has been accused of criminal conduct arising 
out of violence that the police perceive to be necessary.76 
An examination of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force attitudes 
toward internal employment discipline illustrates this phenomenon. De-
spite clear rulings from the courts that disciplinary proceedings against 
officers under the Police Act are not penal or quasi-criminal, but rather 
administrative and disciplinary in nature,77 the proceedings remain 
shrouded in quasi-criminal trappings. The police force uses the procedure 
set out in the Police Services Aces as a forum analogous to the criminal 
courts for the disposition of serious misconduct allegations against its 
officers, whether brought as citizen complaints or not. In serious cases, 
criminal defense lawyers, rather than labor or administrative lawyers, 
represent the accused officer. Formal "briefs," identical to those used in 
criminal prosecutions, are prepared. The practices and procedures fol-
lowed, from providing "particulars" and "disclosure" to "setting dates" 
and imposing "sentences," reflect this perception and reinforce the ad-
versarial and punitive aura of the proceedings. Members of the public 
participating as victim witnesses are isolated from the process and are 
rarely satisfied by the outcomes of the hearings,19 while individual offi-
cers are selected as scapegoats by police management. so 
To the police, the criminal law is a sword as well as a shield. It was 
used effectively in this way in the early 1980s to discredit allegations of 
torture made against members of the Toronto Police Hold-Up Squad. 
75. For example, the well-known police distrust of courts (cf VINCENT, supra note 
33) and disdain for criminals who "demand all the safeguards of due process . . . 
assumes thereby that they [the safeguards] exist." Doreen McBarnet, Arrest: The Legal 
Context of Policing, in THE BRITISH POLICE 24-40 (1979) (on file with author). 
76. Officers were reported to be relieved by their acquittals but confident that '~us­
tice would be done" in the Rodney King, Marion Neal, and Wade Lawson cases. See 
supra notes 21, 69, 70. 
77. Re Trumblay et. al. 55 O.R.2d 570, 590 (Can. 1986), and cases cited therein 
(on file with author). 
78. See supra note 6. 
79. COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE, supra note 5, at 15-61. 
80. Ericson, supra note 27, at 97-101, notes the scapegoating and identifies the 
management goals in this style of discipline. See also Submissions on Behalf of Jane 
Doe: Ontario Civilian Commission of Police Services Inquiry [hereinafter Junger In-
quiry] (on file with author), Parkdale Community Legal Services, infra notes 124-25. 
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Criminal lawyers representing several unrelated men and boys realized 
that their clients had all described a unique form of torture used to extort 
confessions: the placing of a plastic bag over their heads and faces to 
produce a sense of suffocation, a technique known as "dry 
submarining."81 The possibility of collusion among the unrelated accused 
was extremely remote, and the lawyers, in the absence of an independent 
body to review citizen complaints, brought the cases to the attention of 
the Police Commission (the predecessor body to the Police Services 
Board).82 The victims' decision to seek a systemic remedy rather than 
press criminal charges against the officers (which would be unlikely to 
succeed) was the focal point of the police department's attack on defense 
lawyers representing the injured suspects. The defense lawyers were de-
nounced for their lack of respect for the law, for calling for a public 
inquiry by the police commission,83 and for recommending that all po-
lice interrogations be videotaped as a condition of admissibility into evi-
dence against the accused.84 
The strategic use of the special relationship that exists between police 
officers and the criminal law was taken even further in the case of an 
officer who was ordered to resign when the public complaint tribunal 
found him responsible for a serious assault on a suspect that ruptured the 
suspect's testicles and dislocated his knee. The Police Association, the 
police union, which had earlier "declared war" on the public complaints 
tribunal,85 was outraged when the officer was denied the opportunity to 
"clear" himself of the charges in a criminal trial. A police officer member 
of a neighboring Police Association filed a criminal charge in order to 
81. See infra note 82. Similar allegations have been substantiated in Chicago in an 
Amnesty International report (the fIrst ever done on a U.S. city for police brutality) 
and massive lawsuit alleging torture (including "dry submarining") of suspects over a 
twelve-year period. The allegations did not surface publicly, however, until 1989. 
AMNEsTY INTERNATIONAL, UNITED STATES OF AMERICA: ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE 
TORTURE IN CmCAGO, ILLINOIS AI Index AMRl51/42190 (Dec. 1990); Salim 
Muwakkil, New Trends in Brutality From Chicago's Finest, IN THEsE TIMEs, July. 
10-23, 1991, at 7. 
82. The story is told from the police point of view in EDWARD L. GREENSPAN 
AND GEORGE JONAS, GREENSPAN, THE CASE FOR THE DEFENCE 175-196 (1987). It is 
set out as well in SIDNEY B. LINDEN, Q.C., OFFICE OF THE PUBLIC COMPLAINT COM-
MISSIONER, REPORT ON THE INVEsTIGATION OF ALLEGATIONS MADE AGAINST SOME 
MEMBERS OF THE METROPOLITAN TORONTO POLICE HOLD-UP SQUAD (Mar. 1984) (on 
fIle with author). 
83. GREENSPAN AND JONAS, supra note 82, at 175-96. Greenspan denigrates critics 
of police abuse in general and the Toronto Hold-Up Squad in particular. 
84. Id The allegations, and the reforms sought, received considerable media atten-
tion, even in the Toronto newspaper most biased toward police. Lorrie Goldstein, 
Taping of Cops Rejected; Group Wants Video Eye on Police, TORONTO SUN, Feb. 26, 
1982, at 30. 
85. Pat McNenly, Police Union Vows Fight to Abolish Complaints Board, THE 
TORONTO STAR, Dec. 20, 1985 . 
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give the officer that opportunity. However, the Attorney General stayed 
the proceedings on the ground that it was an abuse of the criminal pro-
cess to lay a charge with no honest belief (based on reasonable and prob-
able grounds) that an offense had occurred, foiling the officer's bid to 
clear himself in what he and his colleagues perceived to be a forum more 
sympathetic to them than the one operating under the Police Complaint 
Commissioner.86 
B. LEGALIZING THE FACTS: PATROLLING THE DATA87 
The law is not the only tool used by the police. Indeed, the law 
alone, without a concomitant control over the facts, is relatively sterile. 
However, few modem institutions are as successful as the police at shap-
ing the discourse concerning them. Police control of information is ex-
traordinary in the initial shaping of the facts of an incident or arrest to 
conform to policing goals and legal or psychiatric discourse,88 through 
the presentation of the same facts in court, to portrayal of the case or of 
police work generally in the media.89 Policing discourse shapes public 
understanding of social order,90 resisting outside, non-police control and 
criticism through the use of press releases, "tips" to favored reporters 
(and punishment of critical reporters through denial of information), and 
staged media events.91 The impact ranges from ensuring that there is no 
86. CRIMINAL CODE OF CANADA, ch. C-46 R.S.C. §579 (1985). This statute autho-
rizes the Attorney General of a province to enter a stay of criminal proceedings. 
Charges may be reactivated at any time within a year of the stay. If they are not, 
the charge is deemed "never to have been commenced." They were not reactivated in 
this case. The agent of the Attorney General, in placing his reasons for the stay on 
the record, noted that Weller's "conviction" by the Police Complaint Tribunal had 
been upheld on appeal to the Divisional Court. There was no doubt that the charge 
had been laid as a device, demonstrating a troubling belief in the tendency of crimi-
nal courts to acquit police officers who harm citizens in the execution of their duty. 
Her Majesty the Queen v. Terence Weller, Ontario Court (Provincial Division) Apr. 
21, 1988, before Judge J. Kerr, Scarborough (unreported) (on file with author). 
87. The phrase was coined by Richard Ericson, supra note 19. 
88. Robert Menzies and Dorothy Chunn detail this phenomenon in the context of 
the arrest and diversion of mentally ill offenders. ROBERT MENZIES, SURVN AL OF THE 
SANEST: ORDER AND DISORDER IN A PRE-TRIAL PSYCHIATRIC CLINIC (1989); Dorothy 
Chunn and Robert Menzies, Gender, Madness and Crime: The Reproduction of Patri-
archal and Class Relations in a Psychiatric Court Clinic, 1 J. HUM. JUST. 33, 37 
(1990). The police role is implicit in work addressing sexist stereotypes that permeate 
the criminal justice system. Kathleen Daly, Rethinking Judicial Paternalism: Gender, 
Work-Family Relations and Sentencing, 13 GENDER & SOCIETY 9 (1989); Kathleen 
Daly, Criminal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different Voices: Some Feminist 
Questions About Justice, 17 INT'L J. SOC. L. 1 (1989). 
89. ERICSON, supra note 19. 
90. Currie et al., supra note 22, at 29. 
91. ERICSON, NEGOTIATING CONTROL, supra note 19, at 123-25. The use of the 
media and the promotion of policing discourse by the Toronto force was the subject 
of a doctoral thesis that powerfully documents police skill at harnessing public opin-
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doubt in the mind of the public that the guilty party has been apprehend-
ed to deflecting and shaping criticism and ensuring public support for in-
creases in manpower.92 
1. Police, lies, and videotape 
Police control over the gathering and presentation of evidence is so 
complete that even in the absence of judicial complicity the police can 
generally rely on winning any courtroom credibility battle. However, 
police frequently take extralegal steps to ensure victory. When the legiti-
macy of policing is challenged directly, as in a disciplinary proceeding, 
overt lying is widely recognized as a common occurrence. Andrew Gold-
smith quotes a senior police officer as admitting, "We believe that police 
officers will normally tell lies to prevent another officer from being disci-
plined or prosecuted, and this is the belief of senior officers who handle 
complaints and discipline cases.,,93 
The players in the criminal justice system generally accept police 
lying as somehow natural, almost expected, behavior. Doreen McBarnet 
points out how far this acceptance extends. In a study of arrests, she 
identifies the degree to which sociologists of policing believe that rules of 
law are irrelevant to controlling police behavior because they assume that 
the police break formal rules in fulfilling their functions. This supposed 
"given" is where the analysis begins.94 
ion in aid of bigger budgets and less control. See Margaret E. Beare, Selling Policing 
in Metropolitan Toronto: A Sociological Analysis of Police Rhetoric 1957-1984, 293-
96 (1987) (unpublished doctoral thesis on file with Columbia University). 
92. Manipulating public perceptions about crime and safety is a tried and true bud-
get device, as contemporary and historic news sources illustrate. See, e.g., More Au-
thority For The Police Asked by Chief Grassett With Respect to Theatre Censorship 
and Control of Processions, THE TORONTO STAR, Mar. 6, 1992, at A2 (quoting a 
1908 police report on crime); City is Under-Policed; Inspector Stark Says the Force 
is Short About 125 Men for Safety, THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 24, 1992, at A2 (quot-
ing a 1899 police report on staffing). Not much changed in the intervening century in 
terms of the police approach. However, these tactics are being viewed with increasing 
skepticism. See discussion infra notes 97, 99; Royson James, Police Accused of Bud-
get "Scare Tactics," THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 24, 1992, at A6; John Duncanson, 
More Police Called No Cure for Crime, THE TORONTO STAR, Jan. 29, 1992, at A6; 
Michael Tenszen, Lack of Chinese Officers Blamed on Hiring Freeze, THE TORONTO 
STAR, Jan. 29, 1992, at A6. 
93. COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE, supra note 5, 22-23, 28-30. SEWELL, supra note 
20, quotes from an early decision from Toronto's Civilian Review Board. The tribunal 
members were as shocked by the perjury of fellow officers as by the misconduct 
itself. Mr. Justice Morand, conducting a Royal Commission investigation of police 
brutality in Toronto in the 1970s, noted (and was shocked by) the same thing; his 
very legalistic solution was to increase the regulations concerning officers' notebooks 
and forms detailing the use of force. MORAND, J., ROYAL COMMISSION INQUIRY INTO 
METROPOLITAN TORONTO POLICE PRAcnCES (1976) [hereinafter MORAND INQUIRY]' 
94. McBarnet, supra note 75, at 25, 27. 
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The manipulation of evidence by the police in high-profile wrongful-
conviction cases is easily recognized as "going too far.,,9s However, sim-
ilar distortion of the facts or outright perjury, particularly in confession 
cases, suggests that, to the police, defining "truth" to achieve a police 
goal is as much a tool of the job as understanding the law or knowing 
how to use a stick and a gun. The wrongful-conviction cases merely 
represent the worst-case scenario, which permits an understanding of the 
phenomenon in other contexts and illustrates the inadequacy of legalistic 
solutions alone in addressing ingrained police attitudes and behaviors. 
For example, police interrogations throughout the common law world 
are theoretically closely bound by the legal rules that govern the admissi-
bility of statements. In practice, inside the closed world of the police 
interview room, legal rules offer only an illusion of protection. 
A recent decision of the Australian high court addresses the dichoto-
my precisely. The court set aside a conviction based on a disputed con-
fession and ruled that in the future all juries must be warned of the dan-
gers of convicting on disputed confessions in the absence of corrobora-
tion. The court recognized the extent to which the police control the 
information about an interrogation that is ultimately presented in court: 
"[IJt is comparably more difficult for an accused person held in police 
custody without access to legal advice or other means of corroboration to 
have evidence available to support a challenge to police evidence of 
confessional statements than it is for such police evidence to be fabric at-
ed.,,96 
A recent Canadian study of police interrogations and confessions law 
suggests that the police "push the law to its limits, slip through loopholes 
and employ technicalities" and cannot be trusted "to obey the rules soci-
ety imposes on the way they question suspects.,,97 The study'S ultimate 
conclusion has significance far beyond confession law and is equally ap-
plicable to police misconduct generally: "Police do not so much break the 
law as use it to suit their own needs.,,98 However, the process is not 
95. This aspect of the English pub-bombing was widely featured in media discus-
sions (along with judicial acceptance of police perjury). See supra notes 40-44. 
96. Mickinney v. R, and Judge v. R. 98 Aust. L. Rptr. 577, 581-82 (1991). The 
first factual proposition set out in the practice direction, "Confessional evidence is 
easy to fabricate and difficult to refute," sums up the dilemma precisely. Sean Flood, 
Criminal Cases in the High Coun of Australia, 15 CRIM. L.J. 287 (Austl. 1991). 
97. R.S.M. WOODS, POLICE INTERROGATION 51 (1990). 
98. [d. at 53. This tendency has been identified in the United States as well where 
the implementation of mandatory "Miranda" warnings were widely studied. Miranda v. 
Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). As Gerald Caplan notes, amicus briefs to the Supreme 
Court from both defense lawyers and prosecutors opposing mandatory warnings relied 
on the "fact" that police will "stretch the truth" to appear to be acting correctly 
(without actually changing behavior). Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 
VAND. L. REv. 1417, 1461 (1985). Studies of police compliance following Miranda 
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simply a uni-directional conspiracy by the police to present false evi-
dence; rather, police understanding of both their role and the expectations 
created by legal rules and procedures as to their performance combine to 
produce a "script" that the police see as a necessity.99 Moreover, the 
most common response to police misconduct in procuring confessions, 
setting new rules for making notes and preserving evidence, for example, 
is precisely the response that is most easily circumvented by the police. 
Manipulating the evidence to ensure that their conduct fits within the 
legal rules by which they are bound is described by Steven Box as sim-
ply "business as usual" for police officers: 
They take "law and order" which originally meant the appli-
cation of law rather than arbitrary justice to help maintain order, 
and transform it into the imposition of order (perceived through a 
conservative lens) by the application (legal or otherwise) of law 
(as interpreted by the police).loo 
2. Limit the critics: Patrol the agenda 
That "business as usual" most definitely includes resisting the imple-
mentation of rules or practices that might restrict the police understanding 
of their mandate. The skills that generally succeed in convincing judges 
to accept their version of what occurred during an interrogation - that 
is, manipulation or obfuscation of facts or mutual corroboration of the 
decided-upon version of the facts - are utilized in other contexts to re-
spond to criticism from outsiders or to co-opt an issue and diminish 
critics. The by-now-cliched image of the embattled police closing ranks 
and firming the "thin blue line" \01 is almost a prime imperative when 
conduct that is accepted by the officers as a normal function of policing, 
such as the use of excessive force, is criticized.102 Incidents of officers 
confIrm Woods' perception. Comment, Interrogations in New Haven: The Impact of 
Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1533-48 (1967); Cyril D. Robinson, Police and Prose-
cution Practices and Attitudes Relating to Interrogation as Revealed by Pre- and 
Post-Miranda Questionnaires: A Construct of Police Capacity to Comply, 3 DUKE LJ. 
425, 435 (1983). 
99. Ericson and Baranek illustrate the extent to which courtroom expectations shape 
testimony. ERICSON AND BARANEK, supra note 56, ch. 7. Vincent describes part of 
the process that leads to the development of this skill as frustration or embarrassment 
with the product of one's testimony: the "good" offIcer gets better at providing the 
evidence that will result in a conviction while the "bad" offIcer merely lies. VINCENT, 
supra note 33, at 91-95. 
100. Box, supra note 18, at 96. 
101. This expression, or others like it, is now commonly used. The concept - that 
the police are a slender shield between anarchy and order - reflects their deepest 
sense of themselves. See Box, supra note 18, at 93. It is reflected as well in the 
title and content of Carsten Stroud's popular book THE BLUE WALL: STREET Cops IN 
CANADA, supra note 25. 
102. VINCENT, supra note 33, at 129, quotes an experienced offIcer as saying quite 
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lying or falsifying notebooks or police records to assist a "brother" facing 
external disciplinary action are identified too frequently to dismiss as 
exceptions.103 This tendency is not, however, publicly acknowledged, 
for obvious reasons. The recent statement by a police commissioner that 
police will lie in court to support a brother officer has led to a decision 
to hold an inquiry into the commissioner's "bias." Comments that "some 
police lie in court to protect their partners" were reported in the media. In 
an interview on September 6, 1991, the police commissioner was reported 
as saying 
[T]here's a lot of mistrust in Peel toward the police .... Let's 
say there's an unlawful act committed by police - excessive 
force for instance - and a member of the community com-
plains . . . . The partner of this officer will go to court and lie on 
the witness stand in defence of his fellow officer. I find this 
appalling. These are police words against the words of the com-
plainant. So, as a result, complainants are hesitant to come 
forward. 104 
However, practices designed to deflect criticism and to protect police 
are not limited to denial and obfuscation. The police target their critics, 
derail inquiries with sophisticated litigation and media strategies, and 
transform unpopular initiatives back into the old practices in their efforts 
to preserve the status quo. lOS Reform initiatives that fail to understand 
bluntly, "No one will tum in his buddy when it is a question of brutality or ques-
tionable use of force." 
103. See id. The behavior of the officer who laid the charge in the Weller case to 
assist him to "clear his name" was only one questionable act of many. The Police 
Complaint Tribunal was shocked, as it had been in the Footman case, by the falsi-
fication of arrest reports and collusion in preparing false notes of the arrest that was 
uncovered. See supra notes 93, 102. Justice Morand found instances of altered note-
books and police records and concocted testimony in his inquiry. See supra note 93. 
See also McBarnet, supra note 75; COMPLAINTS AGAINST POUCE, supra note 5; Box, 
supra note 18, at 80-81. 
104. Although later, at her swearing in, the commissioner denied saying "that some 
police lie in court," Peel police chief Robert Lunney is reported as being "deeply 
disturbed" about her alleged comments. "I am aware that these comments have been 
denied, but neither have they been retracted by the newspaper in question." The po-
lice were successful in obtaining an inquiry into her conduct. Peel Police Seek In-
quiry Into Lying Charge; Mary Nnolim: Newest Police Board Member Denies Making 
Comments, THE TORONTO STAR, Sept. 19, 1991, at A4. 
105. The use of a leading criminal lawyer to denounce critics of the Hold-Up 
Squad, GREENSPAN AND JONAS, supra note 82, is but one example of this technique, 
although potentially a very effective one, as it was aimed at silencing defense law-
yers. Dramatic denunciations and threatened court disruptions are also common and 
receive substantial media attention. Activist's Deputation Sparks Walkout By Police 
Chief, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 13, 1991, at A6; Report Sparks Row at Police In-
quiry: Judgments Attacked as "McCarthyism" and "Grandstanding," THE TORONTO 
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these tactics are unlikely to achieve substantive change. 
Police response in Toronto to pressure for the implementation of 
electronic recording of interrogations as standard police practicelO6 dem-
onstrates the scope of the techniques used by police to deflect criticism 
and circumvent new rules designed to curb their conduct. In the wake of 
a wave of pUblicity about allegations of torture brought by criminal law-
yers representing robbery suspects, the police response was typical. They 
hired a leading criminal lawyer to denounce the lawyers, recommended a 
study of the matter, and then purported to agree to begin using recording 
equipment in their interrogations in the future. 107 The police then began 
what they described as the difficult process of introducing the equipment 
into practice and reviewing the results of a pilot project implemented and 
operated over the next four years. lOS However, when the pressure de-
creased with the passage of time and in the absence of fresh allegations 
of extreme abuse, police action in introducing and requiring the recording 
of interrogations fell off both the public and private agenda. In 1990, 
with fresh allegations of serious misconduct against the Hold-Up Squad 
(including officers who had been implicated in the 1981 allegations), the 
STAR, Dec. 4, 1991, at A6; Farrell Crook, Niagara Region Police Probe Stalled by 
Another Legal Snag, THE TORONTO STAR, Sept. 19, 1991, at AS. See also the discus-
sion, supra notes 62-64, of police responses to wife-assault. 
106. Peter McWilliams, A Call for Video Tape Equipment in Police Interrogation 
Rooms, CRIM. LAW ASS'N NEWSL., (Can.) Dec. 1981; Law Reform Commission Head 
Calls for Video Taping of Accused Questioning, ONTARIO L. WKLY., Dec. 23, 1983, 
at 17; M. McConville and P. Morrell, Recording the Interrogation: Have the Police 
Got it Taped?, CRIM. L. REv. 159 (Can. 1983), to list a few (all on file with au-
thor). 
107. In the midst of an investigation by the PCC into the allegations against the 
Hold-Up Squad, the Squad hired criminal lawyer Edward Greenspan as its spokesper-
son and offered to co-operate with a video recording project. GREENSPAN, supra note 
82, at 178. Sidney Linden, the first Public Complaint Commissioner (appointed early 
in part as a result of the controversy surrounding these allegations), investigated the 
cases and recommended that criminal charges be considered in two of seventeen cas-
es. The charges were never laid. He also considered the videotaping proposal and 
supported it: "I am confident that the problem that arose in the Scottish experiment 
[questioning outside the reach of tape recorders, continued secrecy of interrogations, 
taping only the product] will not be reflected in Toronto. In my view, the Metropoli-
tan Toronto Police Force will see the real value that arises from the use of video 
equipment and will understand that it not only protects police officer's interests, but 
the interests of the suspects as well." LINDEN, supra note 82, at 130. 
108. The proposal had never been simply for videotaping a confession achieved after 
questioning; its purpose was to record electronically the entire interrogation process, a 
much greater intrusion into police behavior. Joyce Miller, Summary, in THE AUDIO-
VISUAL TAPING OF POLICE INTERVIEWS WITH SUSPECTS AND ACCUSED PERSONS By 
HALTON REGIONAL POLICE FORCE: AN EVALUATION (Law Reform Commission of 
Canada 1988) (on file with author). The pilot project was seen as highly effective, 
reducing complaints about police misconduct during interrogations significantly without 
markedly reducing the number of "confessions." Halton, however, is not a major 
urban center, and its crime rate is relatively low. 
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issue of electronically recording interrogations was raised once more. 109 
Not surprisingly, no real changes in interrogation procedures were ever 
made. Ten years after the issue reached public prominence, no indepen-
dent record exists of the most contentious interrogations; members of this 
infamous squad have merely added some new language justifying the 
absence of a recording to their court testimony in support of the confes-
sions on which they routinely rely yo 
At the same time, the police aggressively promote their version of the 
facts through the media. The near-fatal shooting in Toronto of a black 
high-school student at a warehouse burglary, \11 shortly after the acquit-
tal of Constable Rapson in the Marion Neal shooting, 112 was met 
promptly with an explanation by the police that the shooting was an acci-
dent. 1\3 Following the shooting, the police moved quickly to do "dam-
age control." The common claim of self-defense in the face of danger 
from a black criminal was incredible given the fact that the young man 
was not armed; despite his apparent involvement in the burglary, the 
victim was an honor student, basketball star, and brother of a police offi-
cer on a neighboring police force. 114 
Although the law requires that all police shootings in Ontario must be 
independently investigated by a civilian unit established to ensure an 
109. R. v. Bounhai Lim and Baouaphani Nola, unreported ruling #3 on voir dire, 
released Apr. 18, 1990 (Can. S.C.O.) (on file with author). Mr. Justice Doherty ex-
cluded confession evidence in a ruling that was very critical of the Hold-Up Squad. 
The explanation for the continued failure to record was not accepted (it "wasn't their 
practice," an unlikely position given that Staff Inspector Craddock was one of the 
officers who had hired Edward Greenspan and agreed to use electronic recording 
some six years earlier). The court identified the issue: "The police appear to have set 
the stage for a battle of credibility on the voir dire and excluded any independent 
source of information which would have supported one side or the other." [d. at 4-6. 
110. Shortly after Lim, in the same courthouse, a judge rejected his criticism in 
another Hold-Up Squad case. The judge accepted the police explanation that video 
equipment was not readily available, without reference to the use of an easily avail-
able audio recorder or the history of promises made by the force about the imple-
mentation of routine electronic recording of interrogations. R v. Miguel, Ontario Dis-
trict Court, May 11, 1990 (unreported) (on file with author). 
111. Andrew Duffy and Cal Millar, Burglary Suspect Shot By Police Fights for His 
Life, THE TORONTO STAR, Nov. 10, 1991, at AI. 
112. See supra note 69 and accompanying text. 
113. Accident Begs Query: "Why Was Gun Drawn?," THE TORONTO STAR, Nov. 12, 
1991, at A6; John Duncanson, Shooting of Teenager "Accident," Police Say, THE To-
RONTO STAR, Nov. 12, 1991, at AI. 
114. Rosie DiManno, Fury, Fear Follow Police Shooting of Black Man, THE TORON-
TO STAR, Nov. 11, 1991, at A7; Moira Welsh, Victim a Basketball Standout, THE 
TORONTO STAR, Nov. 11, 1991, at A7; Man Shot by Police was Roused by Friends, 
THE TORONTO STAR, Nov. 12, 1991, at A6; Shooting Victim's Teammates Struggle to 
Deal With Sad News, THE TORONTO STAR, Nov. 15, 1991, at A7. See also the arti-
cles about Marion Neal, who was quickly labeled "dangerous," supra note 48, as an 
illustration of another tactic. 
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unbiased examination of the circumstances, liS the existence of a secret 
protocol between the Special Investigation Unit and the police was re-
vealed in this case. By giving the force involved "first crack" at the evi-
dence, the agreement appears to allow the police an opportunity to con-
ceal incidents of misconduct despite the clear intent of the legislation to 
avoid such complicity.1l6 The officer who shot the young man has been 
charged, but it is too early to determine how successful the strategy of 
pressing charges will be, since the case has not yet been tried. That the 
release of exculpatory information was deliberate is without doubt, as the 
explanation that the shooting was accidental was volunteered at a press 
conference held specifically for that purpose. 117 
IV. CONCLUSION: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? 
To advance a reform agenda aimed at reducing police misconduct and 
increasing police accountability, responses to police misconduct issues 
must be developed that limit the trap of "legalization" while simulta-
neously exposing the connection between dramatic, overt acts of abuse 
and misconduct that attract media attention and the subtle, systemic, and 
structural influences that reinforce and nourish racism, classism, homo-
phobia, and gender bias among the police. It is important not only to cri-
tique traditional legal strategies, but also to transform them and make 
them work for those who suffer from the systemic abuse of police power. 
The legal system is neither willing nor equipped to make this transforma-
tion. It disproportionately jails blacks and minorities, whitewashes deaths 
caused by the police, and offers little real protection from racist and 
sexist violence. 
This is not an assertion that criminal prosecutions, police proposals, 
and demands for institutional responsiveness should not be incorporated 
into the strategy for change. However, the priority given to these legal 
strategies should be reassessed. More fundamentally, new coalitions are 
needed: between women working against male violence and defense law-
yers arguing for the rights of accused individuals; between poverty activ-
ists and community legal clinics and those fighting for prison and police 
reform. The dichotomy between demands for protection and strict en-
forcement of criminal sanctions and the class and race bias that translates 
those claims into selective, violent policing must be addressed. 
115. See supra note 6. All such incidents are to be investigated by the Special In-
vestigations Unit. 
116. John Duncanson, Metro Officers Take Lead Role in Probing Man's Shooting, 
THE TORONTO STAR, Nov. 14, 1991, at A2; Deal That Allows Police to Probe Selves 
Shocks Critics, THE TORONTO STAR, Nov. 17, 1991, at B4. 
117. See supra note 113. 
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A. TRUTHTELLING: RECLAIM THE AGENDA 
The ability of police to direct the discourse of policing is by no 
means absolute.118 The increasing willingness of mainstream press out-
lets to challenge and question police practices has weakened police power 
to promote the hegemony of policing. Influential public inquiries have 
been held, and the civilian review agency has been improved, partly in 
response to the exertion of adverse public pressure in Toronto. More im-
portantly, the media, which is becoming more critical of the continuing 
racist, sexist, and violent police responses, is placing the issue of system-
ic bias on the public agenda. I 19 
The Royal Commission Inquiry into Metropolitan Toronto Police 
Practices, conducted by Justice Morand, was sparked by media attention 
focused on allegations of extreme brutality against suspects in custody 
and was called to "clear the air" about the shocking allegations. Other 
inquiries were held for similar reasons, and all recommended improve-
ments in the public complaint process. 12O Although these inquiries were 
essentially narrow and legalistic in focus, the record created and the expe-
rience of participants encourages future reforms. 
More wide-ranging inquiries and Royal Commissions have produced 
recommendations and conclusions that have entered public discourse. The 
"Marshall Inquiry" 12 I addressed the possibility of a racist police force 
and justice system imprisoning an innocent man. Shortly after the inquiry 
issued its report, the police shooting of an unarmed native leader on the 
streets of Winnipeg and the acquittal of whites in the brutal rape of a 
young native woman in Northern Manitoba led to a broad inquiry into 
aboriginal justice that identified the systemic racist nature of policing and 
118. Ericson, challenging both the "effects" approach of psychologists and the "domi-
nant ideology approach" of sociologists, identifies the importance of the media as a 
source of "alternative justice" and justice reform. ERICSON, supra note 19, at 219-23, 
236. 
119. The mainstream media was immediately critical in covering one of the latest 
shootings in Toronto. See, e.g., Kevin Hann, Cops Gun Down Mugging Suspect, THE 
TORONTO SUN, Dec. 4, 1991, at 2; Henry Stancu, Police Shoot Robbery Suspect After 
Downtown Foot Chase, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 4, 1991, at A7; Metro Police 
Shoot Black Suspect, GLOBE AND MAIL, Dec. 4, 1991, at A2; Police Shot Unarmed 
Man, THE TORONTO STAR, Dec. 5, 1991, at AI; Gunshock: Latest Shooting Rekindles 
Fears That Officers Hit the Pavement Armed With Guns Instead of Strategy, Now, 
Dec. 12-18, 1991, at 12; Fear Rides Alongside Officers, Police Say, THE TORONTO 
STAR, Dec. 6, 1991, at AI. For information on the increased scepticism at the budget 
tactics, see supra note 92. 
120. MORAND INQUIRY, supra note 93; ARTHUR MALONEY, THE METROPOLITAN 
TORONTO REVIEW OF CITIZEN-POLICE COMPLAINT PROCEDURE TORONTO (1975); CAR-
DINAL G. E. CARTER, OFFICE OF THE CARDINAL, REPORT TO THE CMC AUTHORITIES 
OF METROPOLITAN TORONTO AND ITS CITIZENS (1979) (on file with author). 
121. See MARSHALL COMMISSION, supra note 45. 
w 
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justice in general.122 The trial of Los Angeles police officers for the 
Rodney King beating provided a similar opportunity. The Fund For The 
Feminist Majority made lengthy submissions to the Independent Commis-
sion on the Los Angeles Police Department that influenced the final 
report, particularly the findings as to "Racism and Bias Affecting the Use 
of Excessive Force.,,123 
B. RECLAIM THE LAW 
Although individualized legal actions rarely advance systemic change 
on their own, legal strategies can provide important support to an agenda 
for change. For example, participation in proceedings such as public 
inquiries offers at least two potential benefits. Although it may be antici-
pated that the police will make every effort to restrict the scope of an in-
quiry into their conduct,l24 these proceedings provide an opportunity to 
advance a more broadly based agenda and to create a public record, 
which may provide a basis for future reform work. The recent experience 
of Parkdale Community Legal Services at such an inquiry suggests this 
tactic may well succeed. 
The Ontario Civilian Commission of Police Services12S responded to 
allegations of serious improprieties against the elite Internal Affairs 
Unie26 of the Metropolitan Toronto Police Force in its handling of the 
case of an officer involved with an escort service. Gordon Junger, while 
living with a prostitute, was filmed on an escort call in a "sting" set up 
by Internal Affairs with the assistance of his girlfriend. He resigned. 
Media disclosure of a resignation agreement that promised the withdrawal 
of charges and the destruction of the evidence against him prompted the 
inquiry. At that inquiry, Parkdale Community Legal Services represented 
122. REPORT OF THE ABORIGINAL JUSTICE INQUIRY OF MANITOBA, VOL. I: THE 
JUSTICE SYSTEM AND ABORIGINAL PEOPLE (1991) (on file with author) (A.C. Hamil-
ton, Assoc. Chief Justice, and C.M. Sinclair, Assoc. Chief Judge, Commissioners). 
123. REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DE-
PARTMENT 67-94 (1991) (on file with author). 
124. Currie et al., supra note 22, are critical of inquiries, such as the Morand Inqui-
ry, as individualizing and legitimating. There is no question they have that tendency. 
However, it is neither necessary nor inevitable that this be so. T. Sher Singh, Police 
Commission Inquiry Must Go On, THE TORONTO STAR, July 20, 1991, at A27. Inter-
nal Affairs was represented at this inquiry by Edward Greenspan, who had earlier 
assisted the Hold-Up Squad in its media strategy, supra note 83. He subsequently rep-
resented one of the officers charged (and acquitted) in the Wade Lawson shooting, 
supra note 70. 
125. The commission ultimately supervises all police forces in the Province. Munici-
pal Police Services Boards report to it, and it serves as a Police Services Board to 
the Ontario Provincial Police, which is a force analogous to state police forces in the 
United States. See supra note 6. 
126. A unit answers directly to the chief and is mandated to investigate serious or 
systemic misconduct or corruption. 
H 
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a woman dissatified with the Internal Affairs investigation of an officer 
who had used his status to extort sexual favors from her. He had been 
permitted to plea bargain a lenient penalty in internal disciplinary pro-
ceedings, no criminal charges had been laid against him, and a promise 
of anonymity made to her had not been kept. PeLS obtained standing on 
her behalf at the inquiry and worked to broaden its scope. 127 
PCLS involvement on behalf of this sympathetic victim contributed to 
the production of an extraordinary record on the extent of police resis-
tance to public accountability, which received wide media attention. 128 
Evidence of Internal Affairs' treatment of the two cases, particularly that 
of Jane Doe, demonstrated that Internal Affairs routinely failed to notify 
the Police Complaints Commissioner that a public complaint had been re-
ceived, as required by the Police Services Act. 129 Some 192 files alleg-
ing serious misconduct had never been scrutinized by the Police Com-
plaints Commissioner, nor had the complainants been given a right to 
appeal a decision about the handling of their complaints. 
Internal Affairs asserted that it believed allegations of "criminal" 
misconduct did not require notification to the PCC, a claim supported by 
senior officers right up to the chief.130 Clearly, Internal Affairs sought 
to drastically limit the scope of the Public Complaints Commission civil-
ian review. Internally developed practices and procedures ensured that the 
vast majority of serious allegations of misconduct were beyond civilian 
review. The revelation of this practice at the inquiry brought it to an end. 131 
127. Inquiry established June 1990 by the Ontario Commission on Police Services 
into the policies Practices and Procedures of the Internal Affairs Unit of the Metro-
politan Toronto Police Force. See Junger Inquiry, supra note 80. "Jane Doe" was 
granted standing, and the case of officer Brian Whitehead was included in the inquiry 
in March 1991. 
128. Alan Story, A Submission to the Ontario Police Commission public inquiry 
into the internal investigation of alleged wrongdoing by Metro Toronto police officers; 
Parkdale Community Legal Services per Dianne L. Martin, Submissions on Behalf of 
Jane Doe, OCCP Inquiry (on file with author and Commission). Glenn Cooley, Police 
Offenders Easy Ride, Now, Oct. 24-30, 1991, at 10 ("Police authorities are a soft 
touch when disciplining officers who cross the line into illegality. What would have 
happened to you or me if we had been sentenced for that assault [on Jane Doe]? It 
sends the message that police officers can be aggressive and violent and the cost is 
minimal"); Glenn Cooley, Police Board Lawyer Opposing Special Bias Probe, Now, 
Sept. 5-11, 1991, at 23 (on file with author) (article reports lawyer Dianne Martin 
saying she fears there is systemic discrimination in the way the police department's 
internal affairs unit treats complaints made by women against officers of the force); 
Rosie DiManno, Surprise Query at Police Probe Raises Questions, THE TORONTO 
STAR, Nov. 6, 1991, at A7. See also supra note 17. 
129. See supra note 6. 
130. Andrew Duffy, Complaints Hidden by Police, THE TORONTO STAR, Aug. 22, 
1991, at A2. 
131. Sally Ritchie, 192 Police Files Demanded, Probe Told, THE TORONTO STAR, 
Aug. 28, 1991, at A6. Editorial, What are Cops Hiding?, SHARE, Aug. 29, 1991, at 
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In addition to demonstrating the degree to which the "ends justify the 
means" in the matter of the resignation agreement (which the police 
described as a "con" on Junger's lawyer), PCLS raised serious questions 
about the adequacy of responses by the force to issues of sexual assault 
and harassment of vulnerable women by police officers. Allegations from 
prostitutes about violent sexual assaults perpetrated by an officer (or 
officers) known on the street as "sperm whale" were referred to a morali-
ty squad for investigation when the offending officer was reputed to be 
the member of a morality squad. Although the impact of such a step was 
acknowledged by investigators, it was supported by the unit commander. 
That same commander testified that he would not discipline a junior 
officer who failed to "take action" in accordance with directives on wife-
assault because he viewed those directives as an improper restriction on 
constabulary independence. 
The panel heading the inquiry strongly criticized the performance of 
Internal Affairs and the attitudes reflected by its performance. In regard 
to the treatment of PCLS client Jane Doe in particular, and toward wom-
en complainants in general, the inquiry acknowledged the operation of 
systematic bias: "The force was simply too eager to deflect public criti-
cism from itself. It reacted defensively and in the process disregarded the 
interests of an individual who was twice victimized - by the original of-
fence and by the police disciplinary system.,,132 
C. RECLAIM THE AGENDA: COALITIONS AND COMMUNITY 
Ultimately, only persistent political pressure will effect significant 
change in policing practices. Toronto's highly praised133 model for ci-
vilian review was developed in response to a series of public inqui-
ries 134 and mounting public pressure concerning the increased incidence 
8. Jack Lakey, Watchdog Entitled to Complaints Files, Eng Concedes, THE TORONTO 
STAR, Aug. 30, 1991, at A7. It is troubling, but not surprising, that after years of 
struggling against police resistance, the current commissioner, shortly before the reve-
lations at tpe Junger Inquiry, expressed optimism about his agency's triumph over that 
resistance. Lewis, supra note 5, at 153-76. 
132. THE ONTARIO CNILIAN COMMISSION ON POlleE SERVICES, REPoRT OF AN 
INQUIRY - INTO ADMINISTRATION OF INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS BY THE METROPOll-
TAN TORONTO POllCE FORCE 58-76 (1992) (see chapter 9, Treatment of Victims). The 
commission was equally critical of the resignation agreement: "Either way the actions 
of the force demonstrate a tremendous lack of integrity . . . . If a police force would 
act dishonourably to get rid of one of its own officers, can the public count on it to 
act honourably in cases involving civilians?" [d. at 29. 
133. Petterson, supra note 7. 
134. The Morand Inquiry, supra note 93, was perhaps the most influential. Parkdale 
Community Legal Services also took part in this inquiry. The clinic brief proposed 
closer contact between the police and the community, including an active role for 
community members in the administration of police activities. Justice Morand respond-
ed favorably to the submissions. 
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of police misconduct, including a succession of police shootings,135 a 
massive raid on gay bath houses that ultimately produced almost no con-
victions,136 and allegations of torture in the questioning of robbery sus-
pects. 137 However, these events were connected in an effective way on-
ly through consensus pressure. 
The PCLS police reform project is drawing on an earlier project in its 
collaborative approach. In the summer of 1981, six years after the fIrst 
reports recommending civilian control of the police complaint process 
were issued, the individuals and community organizations most targeted 
by the misconduct - blacks and visible minorities, gays and lesbians, 
suspects in custody, and those who worked with them - formed a coali-
tion to respond directly to community concerns. Citizens Independent 
Review of Police Activities (CIRPA) formed itself into an effective com-
munity voice. CIRPA members, working out of a progressive alderman's 
offIce, undertook an ambitious project of community-driven review, oper-
ating a twenty-four-hour citizen complaint hotline and offering support, 
advice, and legal referrals to individuals fIling complaints against the 
police. CIRP A used data from complaints received through the hotline to 
develop initiatives for law reform. Police supporters used claims that 
CIRP A was a hotbed of dangerous radicals and that it exaggerated com-
plaints and exacerbated police-community relations to undermine the 
group's reputation. At the same time, the newly formed offIcial civilian 
review agency, the PCC,138 acknowledged CIRPA's role as helpful at 
raising and addressing issues beyond the PCC's scope. 139 CIRPA, pri-
marily a voluntary organization, disbanded four years later. 
It has been suggestedl40 that organizations such as CIRPA inevita-
bly become co-opted by policing discourse and thus do not represent a 
135. The Johnson shooting was the critical spark. See COMPLAINTS AGAINST POLICE, 
supra note 5, at 65-67. 
136. Described in SEWELL, supra note 20, at 184. 
137. See supra notes 80-84. For a review of this history, see Lewis, supra note 5, 
at 153-76; see also SEWELL, supra note 20, at 181-86. 
138. The Office of the Police Complaint Commissioner (PCC), supra note 6. 
139. See GREENSPAN AND JONAS, supra note 82, for the "conservative" view of 
CIRPA and its members. Maeve W. McMahon, CIRPA: A Case Study of the Reform 
Process and the Police Institution (1983) (unpublished masters' thesis on file with the 
University of Toronto); Currie et al., supra note 22, at 41. Much of the data appears 
in M.W. McMAHON AND R.V. ERICSON, POLICING REFORM: A STUDY OF THE RE-
FORM PROCESS AND POLICE INSTITUTIONS IN TORONTO (1984), cited in Currie et al., 
supra note 22. 
140. A masters' thesis on CIRPA details its initial effectiveness but suggests the 
members were ultimately co-opted into the "policing discourse" and that the process 
is almost inevitable with "extra-governmental" reform groups. However, many of the 
members of CIRPA are active in a new reform coalition, Metropolitan Toronto Police 
Reform Coalition (MTPRC), and show no sign of having been coopted. MCMAHON, 
supra note 139. 
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basis for long-term changes in police accountability and conduct. Al-
though this paper has documented the challenges faced by community-
based reform initiatives, it would be ahistoric to fail to recognize the 
long-term importance of such initiatives. Community-based response 
depends upon the enduring importance of such initiatives to individual 
victims and the experience and insight of the organizers. These resources 
are not lost when a group disbands. However, the relearning of scattered 
knowledge and the reclaiming of critical history takes precious time and 
energy, as community concern about a new police reform issue sparks 
"new" reform initiatives. Preservation of that history, that record, is es-
sential to reform initiatives that seek structural change. 
D. A PERMANENT HOME FOR REFORM: THE PCLS RESPONSE 
A legal community clinic established recognition of the enduring 
nature of police misconduct, the importance of sustained pressure for 
change, and the need for support among individuals and communities in a 
police reform initiative. Parkdale Community Legal Services, building on 
previous ad hoc experience with policing issues,141 has made a police 
reform project a clinic-wide priority. 142 
The involvement of a stable, respected community legal clinic associ-
ated with a major law school143 is important in many ways. Institutional 
resources are frequently unavailable to groups and individuals working on 
potentially divisive and frequently unpopular projects like police miscon-
duct, so ad hoc, reaction-driven initiatives tend to dominate. The alliance 
of skilled organizers and lawyers with the intellectual support of the law 
school provides needed support. Moreover, law students, aside from valu-
able legal and community work, will help to insure continuity and the 
preservation of an institutional memory in researching and writing law 
reform papers each term.l44 The clinic's credibility with both the com-
141. For example, PCLS has served as counsel at the Morand Inquiry and the 
Junger Inquiry and as representative in individual police misconduct cases regarding 
protection of assaulted women and tenants' disputes with their landlords. 
142. The PCLS board of directors adopted the initiative at its February 1992 
meeting, relying in large part on student initiatives. See Lee Mitchell, A Proposal to 
the Board of Directors of Parkdale Community Legal Services for the Establishment 
of a PCLS Policing Project (on file with author). The proposal was based on Lee 
Mitchell, Police Misconduct and Community Response (Dec. 1991) (unpublished 
manuscript on file with the Intensive Programme In Poverty Law, Parkdale Communi-
ty Legal Services/Osgoode Hall Law School). 
143. See supra notes 9-11 and accompanying text. 
144. The establishment of the project was advanced by the paper by Lee Mitchell, 
supra note 142. That intellectual work has continued this term with a paper analyzing 
"community policing." Alan Story, The Community Policing Bandwagon: Should We 
Hop Aboard (Apr. 1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with Intensive Programme in 
Poverty Law, Osgoode Hall Law School). 
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munity and institutions, earned over twenty years,145 lends weight to 
proposals for fundamental change and shields unpopular critics of the 
police from police and institutional reprisals. Finally, the clinic's commit-
ment to community education and organizing, casework, and law reform 
as inextricably interconnected in the redress of social injustice will ad-
vance the goal of limiting reliance on legalistic or superficial 
strategies. l46 As one of the staff lawyers stated: 
[T]he history, stability and resources of my community-based 
employer provide me with a certain credibility and ability that 
cannot be matched by most private practitioners. Simply put, this 
clinic provides a base. That base can provide moral and physical 
support or expertise. Or it can be the headquarters for strategizing 
or the clearing house for information for project workers.147 
1. Community education and organizing 
The clinic is initiating a number of community education projects to 
provide basic information about rights to groups and individuals. The 
clinic's work with street people, the homeless, prostitutes, and recent 
immigrants has highlighted both the need and potential for such informa-
tion. A card outlining "your rights with the police" in several languages 
and emergency phone numbers is being prepared for distribution. This is 
basic work, but it has not been done for many years.148 Information en-
genders confidence, both in individuals ready to "fight back" and in those 
too demoralized to do so, and serves to dispel disempowering myths 
about the police force. An information "kit" is also being developed for 
distribution to community groups, with law students prepared to conduct 
information sessions. The clinic is also a member of the new Metropoli-
tan Toronto Police Reform Coalition, and staff lawyers and students have 
not only attended meetings but also produced materials and proposals for 
the coalition. 
2. Casework 
The project is providing support to individuals who have complaints 
about police misconduct and will help focus spontaneous community 
responses to these specific incidents. Essential legal and support services 
145. See supra notes 9-11. 
146. The board, in approving the project, provided for board approval for involve-
ment in any major litigation, in recognition of both the demands such litigation places 
on the clinic and the need to ensure that the litigation in fact has transformative 
potential. 
147. Kuszelewski, supra note 13. 
148. CIRPA produced and distributed such a card with considerable success. See 
supra notes 138-40. 
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for victims of police misconduct is not readily available from the practic-
ing bar in Toronto and can be augmented by student client support, re-
search, and summary advice as a resource for lawyers in this field. The 
clinic is currently involved in this work supporting a woman whose arm 
was broken by police during a recent demonstration. 149 At the same 
time, providing these services creates a valuable organizing tool for com-
munity-based organizations working on issues of systemic racism and 
gender bias and identifies law reform cases and possibilities. 
3. Law reform 
Researchers are producing an intake information sheet to collect data 
to show that particular incidents are not isolated or unique. At the same 
time, casework is analyzed for test-case potential. In a current case, 150 
the clinic is representing a civilian employee of the Toronto force in a 
sexual harassment claim. Apart from challenging the rule that denies the 
victim standing at a disciplinary hearing, the clinic has developed a ha-
rassment protocol for the Police Services Board. 
The clinic director is assigning police reform cases to lawyers 
throughout the clinic, so that policing law reform initiatives and research 
are being integrated into all four divisions: Family, Housing, Worker's 
Rights, and Immigration. The goal is to create a coordinated, community-
based demand for fundamental change. 
4. Endnote 
If a people deserve the government they choose, it is equally true of 
the policing they receive. Policing that targets minorities, celebrates bru-
tality, and acts as its own judge and jury does not persist without support 
from those with the power to insist on a different model. At the same 
time, the problems (like drug trafficking, violence, robbery, and rape) 
supposedly addressed by current police methods are not mere chimeras of 
right-wing scare-mongerers. They exist and produce pain and despair. It 
is time to abandon the politics of convenience and expediency and truly 
address the structural forces that define crime and control. The riots that 
returned to Los Angeles after twenty-five years of inaction and arrived in 
Toronto in their wake will be a holocaust twenty-five years from now if 
the lessons learned and relearned are not applied now. 
149. The woman, a respected black artist, was seriously injured and then charged 
with assaulting a police officer. The details of the case are being held confidential. 
File Reference: "Winsom" (on file with author). As well as providing direct support, 
the clinic is working with a support group and has referred her to experienced crimi-
nal and civil counsel who have agreed to represent her pro bono with the clinic's 
assistance. Id. 
150. The file is being held confidential. File Reference: "A.B." (on file with author). 
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